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Chapter 3 
Communicative Rationality in 
European Governance? 
Interests and Communicative 
Action in Functionally 
Differentiated Single Market 
Regulation. 
Thomas Gehring' 
I. Introduction 
European governance is, like international relations and domestic politics, 
not least because it is organised by communication. Neither states and 
their bureaucracies, nor the supranational organs and interest groups are 
mere dumb players on the chess board of European politics. They 
constantly talk to each other, explain their preferences and proposals, and 
negotiate about collective decisions. Recent contributions suggest that the 
arrangements of decision-making in the European Union systematically 
induce actors to deliberate and produce more reasonable (i.e., 'better' 
and, therefore, more legitimate) outcomes than are expected from 
traditional intergovernmental bargaining schemes. Special attention is 
I gratefully acknowledge funding by the German Research Foundation 
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drawn to a particularity of the European polity, namely, to governance 
through committees (Joerges/Vos 1999, Christiansen/ Kirchner 2000). It 
is believed, for example, that decision-making within a particular type of 
the so-called Comitology committees transforms governance from 
intergovernmental bargaining into supranational deliberation (Joerges/ 
Neyer 1997a, 1997b) and leads to a particular form of 'good governance' 
Goerges 1999). 
While the ubiquity of communication in European and 
international governance may be empirically observed, its relevance for 
collective decision processes is still subject to dispute. The question is 
whether communication constitutes a factor which influences outcomes 
separately from other important explanatory factors such as established 
interests (preferences) and power. On this issue, a new line of conflict has 
developed in recent years (e.g., Eriksen/Weigard 1997, Risse 2000) along 
the firmly established divide between rationalists and constructivists 
(Keohane 1988, Lapid 1989). 
For rationalists, communication plays an inferior role compared 
to other explanatory factors. Empirically observed communication among 
actors is frequently treated as unimportant 'noise'. After all, co-
ordination, and even co-operation in Prisoners' Dilemma situations, may 
'evolve' without communication (Axelrod 1984). If rational choice 
theory recognises that communication may matter even for rational utility 
maximizers, it does so in the forms of cheap talk (Farrell/Rabin 1996) 
and signalling (Morrow 1994). The constructivist side of the meta-
theoretical divide, having, in the past, been basically concerned with the 
role of norms and institutions for the formation and development of 
actors' preferences, and having complemented the rationalist logic of 
consequentialism' with a norm-oriented 'logic of appropriateness' 
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(March/Olsen 1998), witnesses a 'cognitive turn' (Checkel 1996). 
Communication has been introduced into the analysis of European and 
international politics in the forms of epistemic communities (Haas 1989, 
1992), speech act theory (see Kratochwil 1989: 30-39, 1993), and 
communicative action (Müller 1994, Bisse-Kappen 1996, Risse 2000). 
Drawing on the Theory of Communicative Action developed by Jürgen 
Habermas (1981), it is argued that neither European nor international 
governance is limited to the balancing of fixed preferences. Through 
communication, actors may convince each other, and thereby affect each 
others' preferences. Reasons, in addition to power, are identified as a 
second source of influence on the outcomes of co-ordination processes. 
While the field is still new and somewhat incoherent, it is rooted 
in two rather different research interests. Its normative branch is linked to 
the deliberative democracy tradition (Habermas 1992, Eriksen/Fossum 
2000, Cohen/Sabel 1997, Dryzek 2000), which focuses on the 'input' 
side of the policy-making process, and on perspectives to overcome the 
legitimacy problem of governance institutions beyond the nation-state 
(Zürn 2000). It argues that legitimacy may be achieved through an 
exchange of public arguments and reasoning among free and equal 
citizens because the reasonableness of policy options may be scrutinised in 
public discourses. Publicly binding-decisions ought to be made in a 
deliberative way, rather than by mere aggregation of preferences (Cohen 
1989, Jacobsson 1997). While the normative branch implicitly assumes 
that deliberative governance does exist, or is at least possible, in the real 
world, it does not address the empirical issue of how far existing polities 
such as international institutions and the European Union already fit this 
ideal, nor the theoretical issue of where the limits of deliberative 
governance are located (see contributions in Elster 1998). 
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A much less well developed analytical branch of inquiry examines 
the conditions under which communicative action may be relevant to 
real-world political processes. Jon Elster (1994, see, also, Saretzki 1996) 
argued, for example, that the participants of constitutional assemblies will 
be inclined to promote generally justifiable propositions if negotiations 
are transparent to an attentive public. Accordingly, he constructed an 
ideal-type of 'arguing' based on transparency, which is diametrically 
opposed to rational-choice bargaining. However, we cannot expect 
transparency of negotiations always to lead to the rule of reasons, instead 
of to the traditional aggregation of parochial interests. Moreover, we 
cannot exclude that interaction behind closed doors, for example, among 
scientists, takes place discursively. Remarkably, Habermas designed his 
concept of communicative action originally in the first place for intra-
family co-ordination (Habermas 1981). Hence, the publicity of a 
communication process is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient, condition 
for deliberation. The interaction mode of 'arguing' must be established 
independently of public observance (Gehring 1996, 2002: 107-121). 
For this purpose, the concept of a 'logic of arguing' (Risse 2000: 
4) complementing the traditional 'logic of consequences' and the 'logic of 
appropriateness' is analytically of limited assistance as long as it is based on 
a particular model of 'communicative man' which matches the traditional 
models of 'economic man' and 'sociological man'. Thus, it will merely 
describe a particular form of interaction without helping us to understand 
under which conditions real-world actors may be systematically expected 
to interact according to this particular logic. To explore this question 
theoretically, we will have to follow the path indicated by Elster and find 
an answer to the following analytical question: Under which conditions 
will an actor voluntarily follow a logic of arguing as the best form of 
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strategic action, even if he, first and foremost, endeavours to maximise his 
own utility and declines to subordinate the pursuit of interests to 
communicative understanding? 
If the European Union drives actors systematically towards 
deliberation, i.e., interaction based on reasons, rather than power, this 
effect will be the result of its unique institutional arrangements. It is 
observed that committee decision-making is characterised by a 
comparatively low level of conflict, and that decisions are usually adopted 
by consensus (Falke 1996). This is, in a somewhat ad hoc fashion, basically 
explained by the fact that the participating civil servants are 'socialised' by 
their intense and regular collaboration, and become used to deliberative 
problem-solving (Neyer 1997: 30, Wessels 1998: 228) as well as the 
presence of European law. In other contributions, attention is drawn to 
the relevance of scientific committees (Gehring 1999, Krapohl 2003). In a 
whole series of articles, Majone {e.g., 1997, 2001) argues that independent 
regulatory agencies, if made accountable, will, in many cases, provide 
more problem-adequate {i.e., 'better') decisions than majoritarian 
governance, because regulation, in contrast to re-distribution, is largely 
influenced by the collective search for good solutions (1994). These 
contributions suggest that the institutionalised organisation of governance 
affects the quality of decisions in systematic ways. However, this 
discussion has only just started. Still, contributions are not usually 
conceptually founded sufficiently to support the far-reaching claims that 
are made seriously. What is needed is the careful analysis of the 
opportunities, as well as the limits, of systematically improving the output 
of governance institutions by different forms of organisation of decision-
making. 
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Moreover, contributions still focus on rather specific institutional 
arrangements and ignore the fact that a committee or an agency is 
embedded in a wider institutional structure. Since many of them explore 
decision-making in the single market, it will be useful to examine how 
the decision-making arrangements of supranational governance in this 
field differ from their corollaries in traditional international institutions. 
The purpose of European single market policy-making is strikingly 
similar to that of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In both cases, 
Member States endeavour to intensify the exchange of goods and 
services, by eliminating discrimination against imports, and to remove 
trade barriers. What differs is the way in which collectively binding-
decisions are made. Within the W T O , decisions are basically made by 
intergovernmental negotiations, while the European Union has 
developed an impressive decision-making apparatus that also involves, 
beside States, supranational, transnational and sub-national actors. The 
numerous decisions from which the single market emerges are located at 
different levels of decision-making. At the treaty level dominated by the 
Member States, the institutional framework within which European 
policy-making takes place is hammered out, while substantive decisions 
are delegated to a lower level of decision-making. At the legislative level, 
directives and regulations are basically agreed upon by the collaboration 
of the three legislative organs, namely, the Commission, the Council and 
the Parliament. Frequently, in particular, in the context of the so-called 
'New Approach' introduced as part of the single market programme, 
directives and regulations once again delegate substantive parts of 
regulation to committees, standardisation organisations and newly 
established regulatory agencies, thus creating a third level of decision-
making. Beside this 'vertical' differentiation, decision-making is 
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differentiated 'horizontally'. At the lower levels, decision-making is rarely 
delegated to a single agent. Instead of establishing 'independent agencies', 
procedures usually envisage a number of stages involving different actors. 
In short, single market regulation is the result of activities located at 
different levels and stages with complementary functions. 
Against the backdrop of the discussion on deliberation and 
communicative action, the present paper explores the question of 
whether the peculiar organisation of decision-making in the European 
single market has the effect of systematically sorting out parochial interests 
of the actors involved, and thus promises to produce systematically 
'better' results than traditional intergovernmental bargaining systems. The 
question is whether, and under what conditions, the distribution of 
distinct functions to the different levels and, at each level, to the different 
stages of decision-making, may systematically induce actors to deliberate 
and argue, rather than pursue their parochial interests by bargaining. 
In spite of the long and multi-faceted tradition of integration 
research, we know surprisingly little about the effects of the peculiar form 
of supranational governance. From an intergovernmentalist perspective, 
the Union is still comparable to other international institutions because 
the Member States control the most important decision-making level at 
which the treaties are made and amended, and they are assumed to act as 
they do in regular intergovernmental negotiations. Accordingly, 
integration would amount to a series of 'grand bargains' and subsequent 
consolidation periods (Moravcsik 1993, 1998). The establishment of the 
impressive decision-making apparatus and the delegation of policy-
making are basically explained by the Member States' desire for 'credible 
commitments' (Moravcsik 1998: 73-77). Close to the 'institutional 
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bargaining' (Tsebelis 1990) and the 'rational design of international 
institutions' literatures (see the contributions in the special issue of 
International Organization 2001/4), intergovernmentalism examines the 
Member States' motivation for the delegation and the adoption of 
institutional arrangements fairly well, but fails to examine their 
consequences. 
IntergovernmentaUsm is widely criticised for its inability to grasp 
major aspects of the integration process. Historical institutionalists 
(Pierson 1996, Thelen/Steinmo 1992) point to the fact that a theoretical 
perspective which exclusively focuses on the analysis of major isolated 
events does not account for the development of the Union over time. If a 
decision generates consequences (it is believed largely unintended ones) 
which, in turn, influence subsequent decisions, a path-dependent process 
(North 1990) which was not envisaged at the beginning will be created. 
Modem Neo-functionalism (Sbragia 1992, Sweet Stone/Sandholtz 1997) 
emphasises the role of supranational and non-state actors for European 
decision-making. It is claimed that states lose control, and other actors 
(e.g., interest groups, regions, etc.) take over - at least at the lower levels 
of decision-making which are so important within European policy-
making (Marks et al. 1996). The focus on actors and the distribution of 
power implies a zero-sum game. However, the participation of numerous 
actors other than the Member States in European decision processes will 
not imply that states have largely lost control if the former act in the 
(long-term or 'enlightened') interest of the latter. 
Rational institutionalism (Garrett/Tsebelis 2001), originating 
from comparative politics and having entered integration theory only in 
the 1990, occupies a possibly fruitful intermediate position. Basically 
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focusing on the relationship between the Commission, the Council and 
the Parliament in regular legislative processes (Tsebelis 1994, 
Garrett/Tsebelis 1995, Hubschmidt/Moser 1997), it emphasises the role 
of formal procedures for the distribution of power between these actors. 
Thus, it transforms the analysis of the behaviour and presence of certain 
actors into an analysis of the incentives and opportunities for action 
created by institutional rules. It is the rules organising decision-processes 
that become the primary source of power for the actors involved. In 
addition, rational institutionalism reaches beyond the mere description 
and intuitive analysis of procedures; it provides analytical tools for the 
careful examination of their consequences. Other authors operating in a 
similar strain employ the 'Principal-Agent'-Approach, originating from 
economy and widely used in US-political science (Kiewiet/McCubbins 
1991, Epstein/O'Halloran 1999), to examine the vertical differentiation 
of levels of decision-making. From this perspective, the core issue is how 
the principal ensures that an agent's operations are in conformity with his 
interests. The establishment of several hundred so-called 'Comitology-
Committees' (Pedler et al. 1996, Wessels 1998) may thus be interpreted as 
a powerful instrument of the Member States to control the activities of 
the Commission (Pollack 1996, 1997, but see Ballmann et al. 2002). 
However, once again, 'power' or 'influence' are conceptualised 
throughout as a homogeneous resource distributed among the actors 
involved in a zero-sum arrangement. Other consequences of different 
forms of organisation of decision-making and procedures, such as changes 
to the mode of interaction among the actors involved, or the impact on 
the quality of decisions, (so far) escape the attention of rational 
institutionalism. 
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The argument of the present paper reaches across the entrenched lines of 
academic warfare. It borrows the concepts of discursive interaction and of 
'reasonable', i.e., 'good', decisions from Habermasian communicative 
action which is usually attributed to the constructive side of the debate. 
However, in order not to rely on all too idealistic assumptions, it starts 
from a concept of actors who strategically pursue their interests and try to 
maximise their own utility. From intergovernmentalism, it borrows the 
insight that the Member States establish and maintain the entire 
institution, and design its rules and procedures according to their interests. 
Yet, it recognises that its neofunctional and institutional critiques point to 
important aspects of the Union which are ignored by 
intergovernmentalists. More precisely, it assumes that the empirical clue 
to grasping the consequences of the peculiar institutional organisation of 
European single market policy-making is to be found at the bottom level, 
rather than the top level, of the European decision-making apparatus. 
The paper's claims are three: 
First, Habermasian communicative action provides a reliable conceptual 
foundation as well as useful tools for the empirical analysis of largely 
ignored, but important, aspects of the role of communication in 
international relations and European politics. It draws attention to the fact 
that, alongside power, reasons constitute a separate resource which (also) 
affect actors preferences and collective outcomes. Employing the 
perspective of rational utility maximizers, it turns out that communication 
based on reasons is relevant for real world actors even if they are not 
inclined to disregard their parochial interests. The conditions under 
which this is the case are systematically explored. 
Second, the European Union (and, to a lesser degree, international 
institutions) bear the potential for 'rationalising' decisions in a 
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Habermasian sense. Their decision processes may be organised in ways 
which ensure that outcomes approach the standards of Habermasian 
discourse theory. As governance institutions move along from 'pure' 
negotiation systems towards more complex political decision systems, 
modes of governance change so profoundly that reasonable decisions may 
be produced even if the participating states and non-state actors behave as 
rational utility maximizers and endeavour to pursue their parochial 
interests. 
Third, the transformation of governance is based on a single important 
social mechanism, namely, the division of a given decision-load onto a 
number of specialised decision-making processes which are functionally 
complementary. The functional differentiation of decision-making forms 
the basis for three related mechanisms. It provides room which favours 
actors who wish to achieve decision-making through the arguing mode 
rather than the bargaining mode, thus depriving actors of some of their 
original opportunities to pursue their parochial interests. It allows the task 
of goal-formation to be separated from that of the implementation of the 
established goals. And it constitutes the foundation for systems of 'checks 
and balances' in which the room of manoeuvre of any given decision-
making stage is limited by both the previous and subsequent stages. This 
does not mean that every functionally differentiated decision-making 
apparatus will necessarily ensure communicative rationality. Instead, it is 
claimed that we can identify institutional arrangements which 
systematically push outcomes towards the normative standards of 
decision-making by deliberation. We find them in the European single 
market regulation, in particular, at the lowest level of decision-making. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 explores the Habermasian 
Theory of Communicative Action and argues that it provides both an 
Communicative Rationality 68 
interesting mode of interaction, namely, arguing, and a useful (normative) 
standard for the appraisal of the quality of collective decisions even in 
cases which do not meet the theoretical ideal. Section 3 examines the 
conditions under which we may expect rational utility maximizers to 
communicate by means of reasons, rather than bargain by means of 
power. The conditions prevaiHng in international negotiations differ 
significantly from those that exist in more complex decision-making 
systems such as the European Union. It turns out that there is some, albeit 
limited, room for reason-based interaction in negotiations, while the 
institutional arrangements of more complex decision systems may force 
even rational utility maximizers to communicate in ways that promise 
rational outcomes in the Habermasian sense. In Section 4, single market 
regulation is examined with regard to the existence of arrangements that 
systematically induce actors to use reasons, rather than power, as the 
dominant resource to exert influence on outcomes. 
2.The Concept of Communicative Action 
The present section is devoted to developing a concept of communicative 
action that is relevant to the theoretical analysis of international relations 
and European governance. From the core ideas of communicative action 
based on both reasons and discourse as a procedure for the collective 
evaluation of reasons, it derives a mode of interaction, called 'arguing', 
which is diametrically opposed to power-based bargaining. This concept 
is based on demanding pre-requisites that make it appropriate for 
normative theorising, but seem to be difficult to apply to positive analysis 
of real-world interaction processes (1). It then argues that the concept 
may be useful for the empirical analysis of both international relations and 
European governance problems precisely because of its normativity. 
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Discourse ethics addresses the question of 'how the world should be', and 
may easily be employed as a standard for the appraisal of social norms and 
collective decisions, which provides an alternative to the frequently used 
Pareto-criterion (2). 
2.1. Discourse Theory: The Power of Reasons in Habermasian 
Communicative Action 
Unfortunately, Habermas starts to develop his concept of communicative 
action by creating a model of 'communicative man' that has entered the 
theoretical debate in International Relations and Integration Research 
(Risse 2000). In communicative action, he argues, actors do not first and 
foremost pursue their own goals, choose the appropriate means, and 
calculate the direct and indirect consequences of different options, as they 
do in strategic action. They attempt to reach understanding and 
agreement (Verständigung), and they pursue their own goals only on 
condition that they can mutually adjust their action on the basis of a 
common definition of the situation. Thus, it seems that the interaction of 
the participating actors is co-ordinated by acts of understanding, rather 
than by a calculus of individual preferences (Habermas 1981: 384-385). 
As will be seen later (Section 3), this may be true from a descriptive point 
of view. However, complementing the traditional model of 'economic 
man' with an additional model of 'communicative man' creates too stark 
a contrast between utility maximization and attempts to reach 
communicative agreement. It undermines a careful analysis of the 
conditions under which real-world actors may communicate and 
precludes theoretical attempts to reconcile strategic and communicative 
action (see Dryzek 1991, Johnson 1993). Moreover, if actors were 
assumed to be able to choose freely between communicative and strategic 
action, it would be difficult to analyse under which conditions they could 
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be expected to act according to the one or the other logic. In short, the 
creation of the model of 'communicative man' is unnecessary, and fails to 
constitute an indispensable part of the Theory of Communicative Action. 
Its use in the theorising of European integration and international 
relations seems to be a - definitional - answer to the question of whether 
communicative action matters in real-world interaction. 
Most fundamental for understanding the essence of the Theory of 
Communicative Action is the distinction between two diametrically 
opposed modes of interaction, namely, bargaining and arguing (Elster 
1992). These modes of interaction are not necessarily linked to different 
models of actors, and permit the examination of the conditions under 
which rational utility maximizers will be inclined to argue, rather than 
bargain. Both modes of interaction are channelled through verbalised 
communication. Bargaining is well-known from the rational choice 
analysis of negotiation processes (Schelling 1960, Elster 1989). "To 
bargain is to engage in communication for the purpose of forcing or 
inducing the opponent to accept one's claim. To this end, bargains rely 
on threats and promises that will have to be executed outside the 
assembly itself." (Elster 1992: 15). Bargaining allows actors to draw on 
power resources that are external to the negotiation process. In the terms 
of speech act theory, developed by Austin and Searle and employed by 
Habermas (1981), action of this type is intended to influence his addressee 
directly by saying something ('Hands up') (Habermas 1981: 389-90). This 
type of speech act will generate effects only if it is accompanied by the 
appropriate (positive or negative) sanctions, i.e., threats or promises 
('Hand up, or I shoot'). The predominant power resource in negotiations 
is the threat to reject a co-operative solution (for exit, see Hirschman 
1970). To be successful in a bargaining-process, an actor must have at his 
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disposal, or endeavour to develop, acceptable alternatives to the 
negotiated outcome (Fisher/Ury 1989). Accordingly, weaker participants 
will affect the outcome less than stronger ones (Elster 1989). In a pure 
bargaining process, power is the only asset that matters, and bargaining is 
a device to exchange signals about the power resources available to the 
participants and to evaluate the (usually unknown) constellation of power 
existing outside the negotiation forum collectively. Agreement •will come 
about as a compromise dependent on the external conditions of the 
bargaining situation. In short, bargaining is "linguistically mediated 
strategic action." (Habermas 1985: 294). 
Habermasian Theory of Communicative Action relies on the 
(empirical) observation that verbalised communication is not necessarily 
limited to the exchange of power-related signals. It also enables speakers 
to act by saying something ('I believe, that the global climate changes due 
to human action'). A communication will create an effect only if its 
content convinces the addressee of its truth or validity. Hence, it is 
intended to create a 'rationally motivated' assent to the content of a 
statement based on common convictions voluntarily agreed upon by the 
actors involved (Habermas 1981: 387). In speech acts of this type, the 
addressee is affected exclusively by the content of the communication. 
Communicative action is exclusively concerned with speech acts of this 
kind that operate separately from the external power resources of the 
speaker and the addressee. It provides the basis for arguing, and is an 
ideal-typed mode of interaction diametrically opposed to power-based 
bargaining. 
In contrast to bargaining which is comparatively well established 
in the rational choice literature, the concept of arguing is still normatively 
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overburdened and requires some careful elaboration. First, there is the 
question of the conditions under which a speech act may be expected to 
generate effects without resort to positive or negative external sanctions. 
Generally, it will create effects if it convinces the addressee of its content. 
To motivate his addressee rationally to accept the speech act, a speaker 
will have to claim that its content is valid, and provide reasons which 
support this claim (Habermas 1981: 406). The addressee will be inclined 
to accept the communicated content of the speech act if he has reason to 
believe that it is acceptable. While an actor's own preferences might 
suffice to advance a proposal, he needs reasons to make it acceptable to 
others (Jacobsson 1997: 71), or the speaker must at least be assumed to be 
in a position to provide these reasons. Accordingly, a speech act is not 
acceptable as such. Convincing reasons replace the sanctions that 
accompany a strategic communication, and provide the foundation for 
the rational motivation of an addressee to accept a stated validity claim (T 
believe that the global climate change is due to human action, 
because...'). They become a resource in interaction processes because 
they provide the foundation for a 'rationally motivated' consent. It is 
important to note that this notion of rationality is completely different 
from the rational choice notion of the term. Rational means the 
provision of convincing reasons for one's validity claims, and not the best 
possible pursuit of one's preferences. 
Even if accompanied by reasons, a validity claim is not necessarily 
accepted by a given addressee. Once again, it will not suffice to reject the 
original claim. In doing so, an actor automatically states his own validity 
claim which will also be convincing if it is accompanied by appropriate 
reasons ('I do not believe that climate change is man-made, because...'). 
In order to reach agreement that is convincing to all parties, the actors 
73 Thomas Gehring 
involved will have to scrutinise and appraise the reasons accompanying 
the conflicting validity claims together. They need a co-ordinating 
mechanism that enables them to resolve their conflict. The procedure 
must be directed at creating common conviction based on reasons, and 
allow collective judgement of the conflicting claims. This procedure is a 
discourse (Habermas 1981: 44-71). In a discourse, the participants 
identify commonly accepted criteria against which the conflicting claims 
may be appraised. These criteria are necessarily located at a higher level of 
abstraction (for example, 'convincing reasons supporting validity claims 
about the changes of the global climate must be based on the rules of 
modern science'). If the reasons related to the competing validity claims 
refer to the same criterion, they may be judged against this criterion ('Do 
the reasons submitted by the participants hold against this standard ?'). If 
the reasons given to support competing claims refer to different criteria, 
the participants will have to look for a commonly accepted criterion at an 
even more abstract level ('How does precaution fit into the rules of 
modern science?'). Once the participants have identified a common 
criterion, at whatever high level of abstraction, they have a common 
point of reference for the appraisal of competing claims at a more 
concrete level (Habermas 1973: 252-255). This is arguing in its pure form 
(Gehring 1996, 2002: 107-114). It allows actors to remove disagreement 
gradually by collectively identifying the validity claims that are 
accompanied by the most convincing reasons. They engage in a collective 
learning process which leads them to an unknown destiny (Cohen 1989: 
25-26) in which at least one party will change its original position if 
consensus is achieved (Eriksen 1999). Collectively reached agreement is 
acceptable for the actors, because it implies that they are convinced of its 
reasonableness. 
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It turns out that a discourse does not exclude actors from having 
preferences, nor from having their moves influenced by them (Habermas 
1981: 385-388, 1986: 364-366). It does not matter whether a convincing 
argument originates from the intuition of a negotiator, or from the fact 
that it fits the interests of a state, or non-state, actor, or from the a major 
investment, e.g., an expensive research programme. Reasons are either 
convincing or not, but they are indifferent as to the ways of their coming 
into being. However, a discourse is not a compromise. Its power to 
convince the participants relies immediately on the 'free compulsion of 
the better argument.' (Habermas 1981: 52). The most convincing validity 
claim is definitely not the one best supported by the threats and promises 
of a particularly powerful actor. Therefore, actors must not resort to 
bargaining power. They may only pursue their interests by convincing 
arguments. For this reason, the participants must disregard the positions 
that they occupy outside the deliberation and offer each other an equal 
chance to influence the deliberation by submitting convincing arguments. 
To solve a conflict about mutually incompatible validity claims, they 
must enter into what Habermas calls an 'ideal speech situation' (Habermas 
1973: 255-256), or they must, at least, assume to interact in a situation of 
this type (Habermas 1995: 553). It is obvious that these conditions are 
demanding and difficult to realise in the real world. They provide the 
foundation for the ongoing discussion of whether the Habermasian 
concept is outright utopianism or whether it is directly applicable to the 
real world (see, for example, the contributions in Elster 1998). Here, it is 
sufficient to realise that bargaining and arguing are diametrically opposed 
ideal types of interaction. While the former is exclusively based on the 
availability of external power resources, the latter is completely severed 
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from existing power resources and exclusively based on the provision of 
convincing reasons. 
Although a discourse is a suitable device for the appraisal of 
validity claims, another caveat has to be made. The procedure does not 
ensure that discursively reached outcomes are always valid. It cannot be 
excluded that two groups of actors having to decide upon whether the 
Earth is a globe or a disc might reach completely different conclusions. 
Even conclusions reached in a sincerely conducted discourse are, 
therefore, always subject to challenge by new arguments. Determining 
the ultimate validity of a claim would require what Habermas calls a 
'reasoned consensus' (begründeter Konsens), which would be reproducible 
everywhere at any time, because it takes every possible argument that 
might ever be submitted into account (Habermas 1973: 239). Despite this 
shortcoming, it has been long established, and is institutionalised in 
modern science, that claiming validity for propositions about the world 
and the discursive appraisal of the accompanying reasons is a particularly 
well-suited procedure for ascertaining the truth. This is because discursive 
interaction is based on the generation of convincing reasons and, thus, 
promotes collective, and, if sufEciendy inclusive, even societal, rationality 
in the Habermasian sense. 
To conclude, Habermasian discourse theory identifies a particular 
form of communication that is exclusively based on reasons which are 
actually apt to convince, or to have at least the potential of convincing, 
an addressee. It distinguishes communicative action ('arguing') from other 
forms of communication which may also be present in social interaction. 
In the form of the discourse, the theory provides a procedure for the 
collective appraisal of conflicting validity claims, which is entirely based 
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on the provision of reasons and their collective judgment according to 
mutually agreed criteria. A Habermasian discourse strictly excludes power 
and parochial interests as selection criteria. Consequendy, it must be 
carefully distinguished from other notions of discourse that are more 
closely related to power (e.g., Foucault 1991). Finally, the Habermasian 
concept of communicative action draws attention to the rationalising 
potential of discourses and provides a concept of societal rationality of 
which little use, if any, has been made in international relations and 
European integration theorising. The outcome of a discourse is more 
convincing than any individual validity claim fed into it because it is 
collectively examined and approved. Remarkably, and in contrast to 
much of the normatively oriented literature on the subject (Cohen/Sabel 
1997, Neyer/Joerges 1997a), as well as some of the analytical literature 
(Elster 1998), interaction in the mode of arguing is not immediately 
related to the transparency of a discourse to an attentive public. It may 
well be employed behind closed doors, for example, by a group of 
scientific or technological experts. 
2.2. Discourse Ethics: A Standard for the Appraisal of Norms and 
Collective Decisions 
Discursive interaction is particularly well-suited to identifying the truth, 
for example, about the facts and laws of nature. In this case, it helps 
decide conflicts about empirical facts in the categories of ' true' and 'false'. 
To determine whether the Earth is a globe or a disk, it is obviously 
inappropriate to refer to bargaining power or to conclude compromises. 
The arguments made, and reasons given, within the discourse about the 
truth of a fact may refer to empirical knowledge and experience made 
outside the deliberation. 
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However, the Theory of Communicative Action, as well as 
almost all of its application in the social sciences, has a decidedly 
normative intention. Habermas claims that the procedure for the 
discovery of empirical truth may also be employed for the identification 
of normatively right social norms and collective decisions (Habermas 
1973, 1992). The many authors who, in one way or another, favour 
'deliberative democracy' (Cohen 1989, Elster 1998, Dryzek 2000) join 
him in this claim. The successful transfer of the discourse procedure from 
identifying the truth to selecting social norms promises to mobilise the 
rationalising power of this device for the organisation of society. The core 
idea is that deliberation allows a society to engage in a process of 
discursive, i.e., reason-based, will-formation (Jacobsson 1997) beyond the 
mere aggregation of preferences as it takes place, for example, in the form 
of parliamentary voting. Thus, deliberatively reached collective decisions 
and social norms are believed to have a higher degree of legitimacy. 
However, this strand of normative theorising is prone to almost 
insurmountable analytical and practical difficulties. Practically, the 
encompassing participation of the population of only one nation-state 
would render the discourse about norms virtually impossible, because it is 
difficult to imagine that an actual deliberation with millions of 
participants will ever achieve consensus. Even in deliberative societies 
collectively-binding decisions have to be made, eventually, in the 
traditional forms of negotiations or majority-voting (Cohen/Sabel 1997: 
320-321). Analytically, how traditionally institutionalised decision-
making may actually be influenced by societal deliberation will have to be 
carefully examined. In polities beyond the nation-state, whether they be 
in the European Union or in an international regime, this would be even 
more complicated (Zürn 2000). In short, this line of reasoning is not, 
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perhaps, the most promising for enriching analytically oriented 
international relations theory. 
Instead, we might draw on normatively oriented discourse ethics 
to develop a standard for the- 'critical' - assessment of the quaHty of 
outcomes emerging from existing institutional arrangements 
(Knight/Johnson 1994: 287). A 'Habermas-Standard' derived from the 
Theory of Communicative Action would simply turn normative claims 
('how should the world be organised?') into a benchmark for the appraisal 
of existing arrangements ('how closely do given real-world decisions 
approach the standard?'). Standards for the appraisal of the outcomes of 
institutionalised decision processes are not unfamiliar in international 
relations and integration theory. Pareto-efEciency is probably the most 
widely used criterion in rational choice-based co-operation theory 
(Krasner 1991). A Pareto-optimum exists in a given situation, if the 
outcome of no single actor may be improved without incurring losses for 
any other participating actor. Another standard is Kaldor-efficiency 
(Kaldor 1939), according to which the welfare losses to be incurred by 
some actors are subtracted from the gains realised by others. Thus, it is apt 
to identify the solution producing maximum social welfare irrespective of 
its distribution. Like any other standard, a Habermas-Standard is not 
exposed to criticism based upon its possible inapplicability to real world 
institutional arrangements, including international institutions and the 
European Union, because it is not intended to describe facts existing in 
the real world. Unlike the Pareto and Kaldor standards, it would rely on 
discourse, i.e., on assessing and appraising reasons, rather than calculating 
preferences. Hence, it must become clear that discourse theory can be 
used to derive a reasonable standard for the appraisal of social norms. 
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A social norm outlines socially demanded or recommended 
behaviour in contingent situations in which other forms of behaviour are 
also possible. For example, a norm demanding to drive on the right-hand 
side will only be relevant if one could also drive on the left-hand side, 
and it could, therefore, well prescribe driving on the left-hand side. 
Accordingly, a social norm cannot be true or false; it may only be 
justifiable or not ('valid' or 'invalid'). Accordingly, a discourse about the 
normative lightness of a norm is necessarily less clearly bound to 
experience, let alone experiments, beyond the deliberation forum than a 
discourse about the truth of a fact. It will be more difficult to identify 
commonly accepted criteria and decide on their basis with regard to 
incompatible claims (Apel 1988: 35-36). 
Let us first tackle the question of how the tightness (the validity) 
of a norm may be appraised in a discourse. A discourse about normative 
rightness will, like any other discourse, be based on competing validity 
claims. At the minimum, there must be a proposal for a social norm 
which claims normative rightness and the rejection of this validity claim. 
An actor could not expect to convince his counterpart the validity of his 
claim if he resorted to the power resources beyond the deliberation 
available to him. Therefore, the conditions of the 'ideal speech situation' 
prevail. Likewise, an actor cannot expect to convince his counterpart 
with arguments that are largely rooted in his own parochial interests 
(Cohen 1989: 24, Eriksen/Weigard 1997: 229). Convincingly, a 
participant will be able to claim only what is generally acceptable to all 
those affected if they disregard their parochial interests and stakes. In his 
'general principle of discourse', Habermas argues that: "It is precisely 
those norms of behaviour which could be agreed upon by all those 
possibly affected, if they were participants in rational discourses, which 
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are valid." (Habermas 1992: 138, my translation). This will be the case if 
nobody can submit convincing reasons which challenge the validity of a 
discursively reached social norm any more. It does not matter whether 
the outcome is in conformity with anybody's parochial interests. 
In order to be reliable, a discourse about norms must take 
account of the perspectives, i.e., validity claims stated and the reasons 
given for their support, of everyone possibly affected by the deliberated 
norm. This may be a small group in a discourse about the choice of the 
appropriate means to reach a technical goal, but it may also be the 
universe of human beings. For the practical application of the standard, it 
is important to note that although all the people possibly affected must be 
taken account of, they do not have to be present in the actual 
deliberations. Habermasian discourse-ethics does not propose to organise 
large-scale deliberations among the actual participants. It relies on a 
hypothetical discourse that takes all the relevant perspectives into account 
and decides on the basis of a careful appraisal of the accompanying reasons 
- rather than balancing the preferences of individuals or accounting for an 
existing distribution of power. Like a judge who reaches, or at least 
should reach, his decision on the basis of the facts, the reasons and the 
arguments submitted during the hearing, a scientific observer may now 
appraise the quality of outcomes of political decision processes by 
weighing the pros and cons (validity claims) and their accompanying 
reasons. It should be noted that Rawls reaches almost the same conclusion 
here. In the 'state of nature', in which nobody knew his position in 
society, which is virtually identical with a Habermasian 'ideal speech 
situation', an agreement could be identified by any single participant: "If 
anyone after due reflection prefers one concept of justice to another, then 
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they all do, and a unanimous agreement can be reached" (Rawls 1980: 
139). 
Employing the Habermas standard for the appraisal of real-world 
social norms involves a demanding thought-experiment. The most 
challenging task may be the compilation of all reasonable arguments that 
might be advanced by the actors who might be affected by a decision. 
However, it does not seem to be more ambitious than the compilation of 
the preferences of a possible large number of actors upon which the 
economic appraisal, according to the Pareto and Kaldor criteria, would 
rely. It could be achieved either by empirical inquiry (Zürn 1989), or by 
inference from the situation structure (Snidal 1985). Secondly, the 
reasonableness of claims must be appraised by examining their 
generalisability and the opportunities to accommodate them in a 
reasonable whole (Eriksen/Weigard 1997: 229). This task will be 
comparatively easy, and probably not more difficult than economic 
calculations of optima if the common interest is well-determined. In this 
case, it will not be difficult to identify the reasons which, if generalised, 
would add up to a reasonable whole, and reject those that do not. In 
contrast, conclusions will be less reliable if the common interest is ill-
determined. The standard will be inapplicable in situations in which the 
actors concerned cannot agree on abstract principles of a common 
interest. 
By applying the communicative rationality, we obtain a standard 
that is based upon a common interest, rather than mere individual 
preferences. In this regard, it is much closer to the Kaldor than the Pareto 
standard. The latter focuses on distribution and depends on an existing 
power constellation as well as the actors' opportunities for action in a 
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given situation, and may thus lead to different outcomes in comparable 
situations. Hence, the Pareto-optimum identifies only a local maximum 
of public interest. In contrast to Pareto, Habermas resembles Kaldor in 
disregarding distributive effects. Thus, both of them are 'idealistic' and 
more difficult to achieve in practice. However, in contrast to Pareto and 
Kaldor, Habermas does not take the positions (validity claims) submitted 
by the relevant actors as externally given. It provides an instrument for 
the appraisal of their rationality (acceptability) in light of common 
criteria. Presumably, some preferences will be more readily justifiable for 
convincing reasons and will therefore exert more influence on a 
(hypothetical) discourse than others. Hence, preferences are weighed 
according to the possibilities of their accommodation of the common 
interest. Habermas and Kaldor will reach identical conclusions if the 
common interest is limited to economic efficiency. Otherwise, the 
Habermas standard is more readily appropriate to account for non-
economic considerations. The standard is not only applicable to 
discursively reached agreement, it can be employed for the appraisal of 
the quality of collectively binding-decisions and social norms, as well as 
proposals, in whatever way they are produced. 
3. Opportunities for, and Limits of, 
Communicative Action in Real-world 
International and European Co-ordination 
Processes 
It is clear that interests and power matter in international and European 
negotiation processes. Claiming that real-world negotiations as such come 
close to Habermasian discourses, or that the outcomes of negotiations 
usually meet the standards of Habermasian rationality would grossly 
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overstate the argument. However, on closer inspection, the provision of 
reasons and the attempt to convince the addressees of the truth or 
rightness of a validity claim may not always be totally absent from, or 
irrelevant for, horizontal co-ordination (Müller 1994, Risse 2000). Thus, 
the question to be answered is: Can we expect real-world actors to 
engage voluntarily in discursive negotiation, or to produce outcomes 
which approach Habermasian rationality? And if the answer is yes, under 
which conditions? 
Methodologically, I do not treat this question as a matter of 
theoretical choice, on the part of the observer, which would inevitably 
lead to a battle between the believers of interest-based action and those of 
communicative action. In order to be as realistic as possible and to avoid 
'smuggling in' (Keohane 1984: 67) idealistic assumptions, I will assume 
that actors behave like rational utility maximizers in the traditional 
economic sense. These actors will not be inclined to argue, or to 
implement discursively reached results if their parochial interests are 
undermined. They constitute a 'hard case' for an analytical theory which 
explores the relevance of communication in international relations and 
European governance. If communicative action matters for these actors, it 
will also matter for real-world actors. In addition, 'economic man' draws 
attention to the limits of communicative action. 
In this section, I explore first the relevance of arguing for co-
ordination in simple negotiation systems in which actors, for example, 
states, sit around a table and exchange their positions on a particular 
subject with a view to reaching agreement. This is the bottom-line of the 
institutional arrangements available to actors beyond the nation-state. It 
turns out that arguing matters and may be expected to drive outcomes 
systematically towards communicative rationality, but only under 
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comparatively restricted conditions (1.). Then, I demonstrate that more 
complex decision-making systems, such as that of the European Union, 
are not necessarily subject to the same restrictive conditions. Thus, they 
offer enlarged opportunities for meaningful communicative action (2.). 
Finally, I identify institutional arrangements which promise to motivate 
systematically even rational utility maximizers to argue not only for the 
purpose of seeking the truth, but also in discourses about the normative 
tightness of social norms. 
3.1. Habermasian Rationality in Simple Negotiations 
It is conventional wisdom that rational utility maximizers, when 
negotiating, resort to bargaining. This mode of interaction is easily 
accommodated with rational choice co-operation theory. Bargaining 
allows an actor to pursue his own interests by introducing the power 
resources available to him into the negotiation forum. The better an 
alternative to negotiated co-operation an actor has, the more credible will 
his threat to leave the negotiation be, and the more influence on the 
outcome will he exert (Elster 1989), and vice versa. From this 
perspective, reasons appear to be a resource for the weak, and it is 
difficult to see why the powerful should engage in arguing if they can 
gain by bargaining. 
Opportunities for communicative action wiU emerge, if, and only 
if, the resort to power inherent in bargaining is not the most promising 
form of interaction in order to pursue one's own interests, even for the 
powerful actors. In his 'Theory of Justice', Jon Rawls (1980: 136-142) 
has identified a constellation in which even these actors cannot usefully 
bargain any more. He points to the fact that actors will operate under a 
'veil of ignorance' if they are, in a 'state of nature', unaware of their place 
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in society, class, status, intelligence, etc.. If they do not know their 
parochial interests, it will not be useful for them to resort to power 
resources or to the formation of coalitions to influence the decision 
process, because they cannot identify the option which is best suited to 
them personally. Evidently, the Rawlsian state of nature is an idealised 
analytical construction. The participants in international and European 
negotiation processes, state and non-state actors alike, are well aware of 
their status, etc.. However, the core idea remains valid: it is uncertainty 
about preferences which will hinder rational utility maximizers from 
effectively pursuing their parochial interests and which, therefore, paves 
the way for communicative action. Herbert Simon (1972) demonstrated 
long ago that actors with limited information processing capacity will 
behave significandy differendy from the expectations of rational choice, 
even though they struggle to maximize their utility (Scharpf: 1997). For 
these actors, negotiations may perform a second function which can be 
stricdy distinguished from the accommodation of fixed preferences in a 
bargaining process (Fearon 1998b). 
Uncertainty prevails even in pure bargaining processes. Usually, 
there are several possible solutions with different distributive effects along 
the 'Pareto-frontier' (Krasner 1991). If the participating actors were fully 
aware of the relevant distribution of power existing outside the forum, 
there would be no point in serious negotiation. For strategic reasons, 
actors are well-advised to hide relevant information. When negotiating 
about the price of a used car, you simply do not tell how urgent you 
need the car and how high a price you are prepared to pay if necessary. 
Accordingly, meaningful negotiations always take place under strategic 
uncertainty (Keisuke 1993). Bargaining communication may thus be 
conceived of as a device for collectively reducing this type of uncertainty. 
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To remove strategic uncertainty, it may well pay for an actor to explain 
why he gave, or refused to give, a particular concession. In their famous 
'Harvard negotiation project', Fisher and Ury (1989) recommended 
principled negotiating. Instead of letting offers and demands clash 
unexplained, they advised actors negotiating about the price of a used car 
to resort to commonly accepted sources of information about current 
market prices. If the participants can agree upon a more abstract criterion 
to solve the dispute (in this case the market price), strategic uncertainty 
may as well be better removed by discursive arguing than by regular 
bargaining - especially if the high transaction costs are reduced. However, 
a discourse of this type takes place in the shadow of an existing power 
distribution. It is intended to modify the negotiation positions of the 
participants, but not their preferences. It relieves the actors of the 
cumbersome and time-consuming interaction in the mode of bargaining, 
but it cannot be expected to lead to a significandy different outcome 
compared to the original bargaining process. It may introduce 
Habermasian rationality into the process of finding a commonly agreed 
solution, but it will hardly affect the validity (tightness) of the outcome. 
If this were the whole story, room for communicative rationality 
would hardly exist. However, the development and outcome of real 
world negotiations, say, for example, on the European Treaties of 
Maastricht and Amsterdam, are tremendously difficult to predict prior to 
their conclusion. Negotiation situations are frequently much more 
complex than their conception as bargaining processes suggests. Thus, 
neither the immediate negotiators, nor the corporate actors represented 
by them (e.g., the states) or the bureaucracies acting on their behalf, nor 
observers are capable of calculating all the available options and their 
implications - be it because they lack the necessary information or 
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because they lack the capacity to process them systematically. These 
actors suffer from 'analytical uncertainty' (Keisuke 1993). They are not 
entirely sure of their preferences, and may be prepared to change them if 
provided better information than was available before. 
In practice, analytical uncertainty which might motivate a 
rational utility maximizer to reconsider, and possibly modify, his 
preferences comes about in two different forms. On the one hand, actors' 
preferences rely on information about relevant framework conditions. If 
an actor is not sure what the problem at stake is, or as to how far he is 
actually affected by it, it will be difficult for him to determine reliable 
preferences. For example, the consequences of the single market 
programme or of monetary union may not have been entirely clear to all 
the participants at the beginning of the respective inter-governmental 
conferences. In so far as negotiation processes produce convincing 
knowledge on these issues, they will motivate rational governments to 
reconsider their negotiating positions (see Vanberg/Buchanan 1989). This 
type of uncertainty addresses disputed validity claims about empirical 
facts. It is particularly well-suited for discursive interaction, because 
empirical truth cannot be discovered in power-based bargaining 
processes. 
On the other hand, the exact location of the Pareto-frontier 
(Krasner 1991) is usually uncertain in complex situations. Thus, it is in 
the common interest of the actors involved not to focus exclusively on 
distribution, but to expand the scope of their envisaged co-operation 
project as far as possible (Young 1989, 1994). By deliberately adding (or 
subtracting) issues (and possibly also parties), they will influence the 
constellation of power and interests of a negotiation immediately, even if 
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no preference of any single actor on any single subject has changed 
(Sebenius 1983, 1991). For example, at some point during the 
negotiations of the Amsterdam Treaty, it became clear that, beside the 
main task of adjusting decision procedures to enlargement, progress could 
be made in the area of justice and home affairs by integrating the 
Schengen regime into the Union (Moravcsik/Nicolaides 1999). This type 
of uncertainty addresses the appropriate overall design of a negotiating 
situation before the arm-twisting type of bargaining over detailed 
conditions and distributive effects begins. It will be open to a common 
search for a promising design if actors do not have clear preferences, as is 
frequently the case. Only if actors are aware of their preferences over the 
design of the negotiations may it become a matter of bargaining in its 
own right in protracted pre-negotiations (Gross Stein 1989). 
In areas of analytical uncertainty, discursive interaction is not a 
mere substitute for power-based bargaining which basically leads to the 
same outcome. It is complementary to bargaining and influences the 
design of the bargaining situation. A rational utility maximizer will be 
inclined to reconsider his preferences upon new convincing and relevant 
information. Accordingly, actors may influence the negotiations by 
convincing their co-actors, i.e., by claiming validity for propositions and 
normative solutions and by reinforcing their claims with reasons. Or they 
may provide convincing reasons to challenge established claims. In short, 
rational utility maximizers may well engage in truth-seeking discourses 
that are meaningful for the formation of their preferences. 
The evaluation of the opportunities for communicative action 
also elucidates the limits to this form of co-ordination. By deliberating 
about the framework conditions and opportunities for co-operation, the 
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participants of a negotiation process gradually remove the veil of 
ignorance which originally hindered them from fixing their preferences 
appropriately. Eventually, they reach a state in which they can define 
fairly well-founded preferences - and are then equipped for bargaining 
about the distributive aspects of the envisaged outcome. Accordingly, 
agreement in international and European negotiations will be very 
difficult to reach exclusively by arguing. It will usually be a mixture of 
both modes of interaction (Holzinger 2001). 
More precisely, deliberation among rational utility maximize« 
will be limited by two factors related to distribution. On the one hand, 
actors will make sure that the outcome of a negotiation does not ignore 
the Pareto-condition, which indicates that no co-operator incurs a 
negative benefit. Usually, an actor will simply reject a co-operation 
project which is of disadvantage to himself. Occasionally, he might accept 
the agreement - but will then refuse to implement it voluntarily. On the 
other hand, a bargaining situation will usually have multiple equilibria 
which differ as to their distributive effects. If they are aware of their 
preferences, rational utility maximizers are not hindered from introducing 
their bargaining power into the negotiation process in order to struggle 
for a beneficial distribution of gains. They cannot be expected to 
voluntarily provide room for deliberation about norms. Accordingly, 
rational utility maximizers will not be inclined to modify their 
preferences by convincing arguments about the normative rightness of a 
proposal because changing preferences would inevitably require them to 
ignore their own parochial interests. Therefore, in negotiation systems, 
rational utility maximizers cannot be expected to select meaningful social 
norms in the form of discursive interaction about normative rightness. 
Communicative Rationality 90 
We may conclude that the demanding co-ordination mechanism 
of discursive arguing is relevant even in horizontal negotiations among 
rational utility maximizes (Johnson 1993, Risse 2000). Although these 
actors only operate in the mode of arguing if it fits their parochial 
interests, they will be open to reliable information and convincing 
arguments in areas of analytical uncertainty. Uncertainty makes it difficult 
to pursue one's interests with no regard for new information, and less 
rational to fix preferences in advance. Thus, the two types of strategic 
(power-based) and communicative (reason-based) interaction are not 
mutually exclusive. They fulfill different functions in negotiations. 
Moreover, collective decisions about social norms will be influenced by 
truth-seeking discourses if the latter affect the preferences of relevant 
actors. However, there are strict limitations to the intervention of 
meaningful deliberation into negotiations about norms. Discourses about 
normative rightness will be irrelevant for the selection of collective 
decisions and social norms in negotiation systems because rational utility 
maximizers cannot be expected to change their preferences accordingly. 
3.2. Complex Decision-making Systems 
Next is the question of whether the opportunities for communicative 
action, especially for the selection of meaningful social norms by 
deliberation about their normative rightness, may be systematically 
enlarged by the particular form in which decision processes are organised. 
It is beyond doubt that the decision-making system of the European 
Union is much more complex than a simple inter-governmental 
negotiation. Moreover, there is a widespread impression among 
integration analysts that its operations are systematically distinct from 
those of simple negotiation systems. I argue that this is the consequence 
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of two general properties of complex decision-making systems, namely 
their ability to overstep the Pareto-condition (1) and their systematic 
reliance on, and integration of, very different decision-making rationales 
(2). 
3.2.1. Diminishing Relevance of the Pareto-condition for 
Decision-making 
Decision-making within the EU is virtually not subject to the necessity to 
observe the Pareto-condition. Instead of a single comprehensive decision 
package to be accepted or rejected by the participants, the EU produces a 
steady stream of decisions with a comparatively narrow scope that are 
separately agreed upon and enacted. Its 'acquis communautaire' is made 
up of thousands of decisions and develops steadily. The whole package of 
European regulation is decided upon only by those countries entering the 
Union, and hypothetically by those considering leaving it. The separate 
decisions are so tightly locked together, that rejecting a single one 
amounts to challenging the whole co-operation project. The selective 
exit from an undesired decision is virtually closed (Weiler 1991: 2412). It 
is simply not possible to accommodate an outright rejection of unwanted 
parts, for example, the Banana Market Regulation or the Bathing Water 
Directive, with membership. Accordingly, Member States are forced to 
choose among the three options which Hirschman (1970) identified for 
members of organisations. They may endeavour to revise undesired 
decisions according to established procedures (voice), or accept these 
decisions in spite of their unfavourable effects (loyalty), or leave the 
Union altogether (exit). A rational utility maximizer will choose this third 
option only if the whole package of rights and obligations of which the 
acquis communautaire is composed produces negative benefits, i.e., if 
Communicative Rationality 92 
membership is less beneficial than non-membership. Distributive effects 
of single decisions are not relevant for this decision. 
The nesting of any given decision within a broader package 
increases the freedom to adopt decisions with asymmetrical distributive 
effects. Whereas the outcome of an isolated negotiation among rational 
utility maximizers may not overstep the Pareto-frontier, if 
implementation cannot be enforced, any single decision adopted within 
the EU, according to valid procedures and in accordance with European 
law, may become effective, legally and practically, without the consent of 
the Member States (Vanberg 1982: 164-165) - contrary to what is 
sometimes believed (Garrett 1995). While acceptance of an unwanted 
decision may seem to be irrational when examined as an isolated 'sub-
game' (Ordeshook 1986: 139-142), it is understood if its nesting within a 
larger game is recognised (Tsebelis 1990: 5-11). Ideally, the European 
Union could be a stable political system even if every single decision, of 
which its acquis communautaire is composed, produced an asymmetrical 
distribution, and was not consented to by the Member States in isolation. 
The pre-requisite is that the aggregate distributive effects of the whole 
package generate sufficient benefits for every single Member State. 
Hence, the European Union provides more room for 
Habermasian rationality than an isolated negotiation system. Its complex 
political system will /enable it to implement decisions that meet the 
standards of Habermasian rationality, as outlined in Section 2.2, even if 
their distributive effects are unbalanced. We do not have to assume that 
rational utility maximizers agree on a system like this in order to overstep 
the Pareto-frontier and improve outcomes. There may be good reasons 
to abandon a simple negotiation system and agree on more efficient 
igements for the adoption of collective decisions (Koremenos et al. arran  
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2001). Bargaining-processes are time-consuming and cumbersome, and 
they are not well-suited to dealing with complex issues. Actors may also 
desire to adapt agreements which are flexible to changing circumstances 
and thus conclude 'incomplete contracts' (Williamson 1987). Hence, 
approaching communicative rationality will not, in many cases, be the 
original purpose of an arrangement, but, instead, will be its unintended -
although welcome - side-effect. 
3.2.2. Functional Division of Labour as a Core Characteristic of 
Complex Decision-making Systems 
Complex decision-making systems are characterised by functional 
division of labour. Regulatory decisions are not merely the result of the 
small negotiation systems that nest within bigger ones. They emerge from 
the collaboration of the different decision-making bodies. The European 
Union, and even its single market policy-making branch, consist of 
numerous sub-systems each of which performs some particular function 
within the larger decision process. Since Adam Smith, it is well-known 
that division of labour may dramatically increase the productivity of a 
production process. Surprisingly, the relevance of the division of labour 
in decision processes has gained litde attention so far. 
To understand this peculiarity of complex decision-making 
systems, it is useful to have a look at simple negotiation systems first. 
Traditionally, a negotiation is considered as a forum for the activities of 
the participating actors. This is definitely not wrong and shall be kept in 
mind in the present paper. However, drawing on insights from sociology 
(Luhmann 1984, 2000) and organisation theory, it may also be treated as 
a comparatively simple social system (Gehring 2002: 133-154). When a 
negotiation begins, some issues are inevitably identified as the subject 
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matter on which agreement is to be reached, while others are 
simultaneously excluded. Moreover, some actors are identified as 
members whose communication matters for the negotiation process, 
while others are not. A communication system has its own boundaries 
and divides the world into internal operations, which are part of itself, 
and everything else, including the actors, as part of its environment. It 
helps focus the attention of relevant actors on some aspects of the world 
and ignore others. 
The emergence of a social system is, first of all, an answer to 
complexity. It would be meaningless if the issues to be discussed and the 
group of participating actors were already well defined. Its relevance 
increases with its selectivity. A highly selective social system will 
necessarily ignore many aspects of its outside world, which may be 
important for its co-ordination function, like a negotiation system 
focusing entirely on power and interests. In contrast, a wide focus 
minimises the risk of ignoring important aspects, but it undermines the 
ability to process the information sincerely, like a negotiation system 
burdened with bargaining over distribution and simultaneous arguing 
about various other aspects (Holzinger 2001). The creation of sub-systems 
constitutes a solution to this dilemma. These systems specialise in fulfilling 
particular functions that are complementary to each other. They operate 
in a form of divided labour. Due to its sub-systems, a complex 
organisation such as the European Union may simultaneously respond to 
numerous different aspects, and process them more carefully than could 
be done in a unitary process. A multi-lateral negotiation process or an 
international organisation which does not include at least a number of 
specialised working groups and committees is indeed a rarity. 
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Let us have a closer look into what it means to create specialised 
sub-systems. Consider an originally undifferentiated inter-governmental 
conference on, say, monetary union, which assigns the task of working 
out the different options and their effects to some subsidiary body, 
namely, in this case, the famous 'Delors-Committee' on monetary union 
(Sandholtz 1993). This step institutionally divides the workload into two 
portions, to be discharged by the regular conference and an outside body. 
The latter will be staffed with experts, thus raising the level of expertise 
and enhancing the probability that interaction will take place in the mode 
of arguing. It will discharge its function best if it concentrates on its task 
and ignores all other issues relevant in the negotiations (e.g., costs, 
political preferences etc.). The greater the number of other issues (for 
example, related to the preferences of Member States) that influence its 
decision-making process, the more it will merely duplicate the main 
negotiations and the less relevant will its outcome be in itself. If the 
intended division of labour succeeds, the conference will be faced with an 
agreed appraisal of alternatives from which it may eventually choose one 
(for other examples, see Gehring 1999, Krapohl 2003). 
The creation of a specialised sub-system does not just add 
something to an existing decision process, as is sometimes believed. It also 
has implications for the main conference. As some relevant issues are now 
taken out of its originally encompassing agenda and referred to the new 
sub-system, the main body will also be more 'specialised' and focus on a 
sub-set of all issues to be tackled in the decision process. For example, the 
EEC-Treaty of 1957 assigned some tasks to the Commission, namely, the 
assessment of the opportunities for co-operation and 'getting the facts 
right', and, at the same time, deprived the Council of these tasks. This has 
the immediate effect of reducing the Council interaction to adjusting 
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proposals to the constellation of power and interests in the mode of 
bargaining. Based on its monopoly of fact-finding and policy 
entrepreneurship, the Commission has developed an impressive network 
of informal contacts to interest groups and outside actors 
(McLaughlin/Greenwood 1995). Moreover, the Council is faced with a 
steady stream of proposals of limited scope and will lose control of the 
whole package of decisions to which Member States are subject, even 
though every single legislative act passes the Council (Gehring 2000). 
Hence, the separation of functions in a decision-process matters because it 
modifies the interaction among the participating actors. 
A sub-system will only be relevant if it has a margin of discretion 
at its disposal. Moreover, it must be allowed to operate according to its 
own decision criteria, which are not applied elsewhere. Otherwise, there 
is either nothing to decide, or the decisions are of little relevance because 
they could as well be taken elsewhere. This has an important 
consequence for the ability to control the operation of a complex 
decision-making system even if sub-systems are formally arranged in a 
hierarchical order. Actors must choose. They may closely control an 
advisory body or a technical working group, but sacrifice the potential of 
divided labour. Alternatively, they exploit the efficiency gains of 
functionally differentiated decision-making, but sacrifice their control of 
the outcomes. If functional differentiation is effectively established, all the 
sub-systems involved contribute their part to a meaningful outcome. 
None of them is theoretically more important than another. 
The application of the theory of social systems to decision-
making in the European Union generates important insights for the 
argument of this paper. First, the functional differentiation of decision-
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making creates sub-systems with their own specialised functions and their 
own decision criteria, which are relevant for successful regulation. It 
introduces decision criteria into the decision-process that are different 
from power-based bargaining and affect outcomes. Moreover, the 
creation of a new sub-system changes the decision-process from which it 
emerged. Thus, a state-centred negotiation process taking place, for 
example, at an EU intergovernmental conference or within the Council, 
may be substantively modified by its integration into a complex system of 
functionally differentiated decision-making. Hence, functionally 
differentiated decision-making may have the potential to supersede 
power-based bargaining and to open a door for discursive interaction 
about the normative rightness of social norms even among rational utility 
maximizers. Second, if division of labour between the relevant sub-
systems matters, their internal operations and their contribution to the 
overall outcome, will have to be carefully identified. All attempts to grasp 
the peculiarities of complex decision-systems by limiting the analytical 
focus to a single sub-system, be it a regulatory agency (Majone 2001), or 
a comitology committee (Joerges/Neyer 1997b), or the European Court 
of Justice (Alter 1998), will inevitably miss some of the core features. To 
explore the effects of functionally differentiated decision-making on 
outcomes, we must carefully assess the influence which the sub-systems 
exert on each other's performance. 
3.3. Functional Division of Labour as a Source of Communicative 
Rationality 
It is quite clear that the functional division of labour does not per se 
ensure that decisions meet the standards of communicative rationality. 
Otherwise, all modern domestic political systems as well as the European 
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Polity would come close to achieving the Habermasian ideal. Thus, the 
question to be tackled in this sub-section is whether we can devise an 
institutional arrangement that is simultaneously acceptable to rational 
utility maximizers and capable of motivating them to behave in ways that 
promise to produce well-reasoned decisions. To put it more blundy: 
under which conditions will the functional differentiation of a decision 
process induce real-world actors to abandon their interest-maximizing 
calculus even on matters of normative rightness and adopt a more 
community-oriented rationale 
This question is addressed in three steps. First, I identify two 
complementary functions which must be discharged separately to provide 
a foundation for communicative rationality. Drawing both on 
Habermasian discourse theory and public choice theory, I argue that these 
are the functions of norm-moulding and norm application (1). 
Subsequendy, I explore the conditions under which rational utility 
maximizers may be motivated to argue, rather than to bargain, in a sub-
system specialised on moulding general norms (2), and in sub-systems 
applying these norms to specific cases (3). 
3.3.1. The Separation of Two Functions: Norm-moulding and 
Norm-application 
If the differentiation of decision-making functions provides a clue for 
devising an institutional arrangement that drives actors systematically 
towards communicative rationality, the first step is to identify the relevant 
decision-making functions. Indications may be derived from a more 
careful analysis of the implicit arrangements of a discourse. To reach 
agreement discursively, a group of actors must fulfil two complementary 
functions. In the first step, the participants develop abstract, i.e., non-case 
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specific, criteria which must be commonly agreed upon. In the second 
step, they judge the particular claims on the basis of these criteria (see 
Section 2.1.). Without producing commonly accepted standards in the 
first step, they would not be joindy able to appraise the empirical truth 
nor the normative tightness of disputed validity claims in the second step 
(Section 2.2.). The same group of actors may well discharge both 
functions in an institutionally undifferentiated deliberation. Even in this 
case, the actors will follow a logical sequence. To reach agreement 
discursively, they must define commonly accepted criteria before they are 
able to appraise the competing claims (Eriksen/Weigard 1997: 299-234). 
The two complementary functions may be discharged by separate 
sub-systems. The institutional separation of communication processes 
does not introduce anything entirely new into a decision process. It 
merely reinforces the actual separation of functions which already exists. 
As a consequence, we obtain a differentiated decision-making system 
which consists of two different communication processes which discharge 
mutually complementary functions and operate under significandy 
different conditions. To reach communicative rationality, actors will have 
to communicate discursively, i.e., based on reason, rather than power, in 
both sub-systems. The development of criteria is comparatively 
unrestricted. It allows participants to discuss and decide how to organise 
life in society, and how to accommodate reasonable demands of the 
different groups. These political justification discourses 
('Begründungsdiskurse'') on the normative tightness of social norms are 
based on even more abstract criteria, eventually being based on the 
'general principle of discourse' (see Section 2.2). In contrast, 'application 
discourses' are much more restricted and closely bound to existing norms. 
Here, actors identify the appropriate norms to be applied in a given 
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conflict situation, like the participants do in a court trial, or in 
administrative decision-making (Habermas 1992: 283). 
Before addressing the question of how rational utility maximizers 
may be motivated to argue, rather than bargain, in political justification 
discourses and in application discourses, it should be emphasised that 
arrangements to institutionalise the separation of the functions of the 
political justification of social norms and their application to specific cases 
reflect a fundamental characteristic of the complex governance systems 
from which they derive legitimacy. Habermas argues, for example, that 
this institutional arrangement is basically enshrined in the fundamental 
principles of the democratic state under the rule of law2. On the one 
hand, these principles ensure that the political system operates according 
to modern democratic principles. (I ignore the fact that these principles 
may not always ensure that general norms are entirely decided upon by 
deliberation; see contributions in Elster 1998.) On the other hand, they 
ensure that the political system is bound to its own decisions by the rule 
of law, and that an administration does not control the premises upon 
which it acts (Habermas 1992: 167-214). Remarkably, it turns out that 
application discourses are not at the disposal of a deliberating public or a 
political majority. Administrative and judicial decision-making 
contributes to communicatively rational governance without being itself 
subject of public debate. Thus, Habermas identifies a systematic 
separation of a political norm-making function and a legal or 
administrative norm-application function as a core source of state-
legitimacy. 
2 Note the subtitle of his most important contribution in this regard (Habermas 1992): 
"Diskurstheorie Rech* und des demokratischen Rechtsstaates" (translated somewhat 
awkwardly as 'discourse theory
 0f k w And demnmrv. 
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We may identify a very similar idea in the public choice 
literature. Functionally differentiated decision-making always raises the 
'Principal-Agent' problem. Generally, a principal will expect to benefit 
from division of labour and specialisation (Coleman 1990: 146, 
Kiewiet/McCubbins 1991: 22-24). Delegation increases the agent's 
capacity to address complex issues and to digest an overwhelming lot of 
decisions (Lupia/McCubbins 2000). However, it necessarily establishes 
new actors (sub-systems) that may develop and pursue their own interests, 
rather than those of their principals (Moe 1990: 121). Accordingly, it is 
believed to create 'agency losses' and control problems (Kiewiet/ 
McCubbins 1991, also Pollack 1997). A closer inspection of the US 
political system reveals a wide variety of mechanisms to control an agent. 
The principal may closely supervise the activities of an agent 
(McCubbins/Schwartz 1987), prescribe administrative procedures 
(McCubbins et al. 1987, Bawn 1997), control the agency's budget and 
appoint its executives (Huber 2000), or adopt detailed legislation to limit 
discretion (McCubbins et al 1989, Huber/Shipan 2001). Focusing on the 
control problem implicidy assumes that the agent should, ideally, be 
motivated to act as the principal would have done in his place. From this 
perspective, the discharge of different, and mutually complementary, 
functions does not yet play a major role. 
A deviant branch of the 'Principal-Agent' literature observes that 
majorities in domestic political systems as well as the members of the 
European Union occasionally establish decidedly independent regulatory 
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agencies (esp. Majone 1994, 1999, 2001). The most prominent example 
is independent central banks, including the European System of Central 
Banks. In this case, a principal deliberately sacrifices the ability to tighdy 
control the agency's activities. A rational utility maximizer will only do so 
if he anticipates that his intervention in subsequent decision-making 
might counteract his own interests. Generally, this will be the case if his 
long-term interests contradict his short-term, i.e., situation-specific, 
preferences. Under these conditions, the order of preferences becomes 
inconsistent (Keech 1995: 38-40) and the actor is faced with the problem 
of the 'weakness of the will' (Elster 1979: 67-68). In light of his 
inconsistent order of preferences, he may pursue his short-term 
preferences only at the expense of his long-term interests - and vice versa. 
Neither the representative-democratic political systems of modern states 
nor inter-governmental negotiation systems are immune to this problem 
of inconsistent preferences over time (Shepsle 1991: 250-252). 
Democracy is government pro tempore (Linz 1998: 19-20), and elected 
politicians have an incentive to calculate in terms of election periods, i.e., 
with a comparatively short time horizon (Cukierman/Meltzer 1986: 
368). 
The dilemma of inconsistent preferences over time will diminish 
if the time horizon of the decision-making system is systematically 
enlarged. The mere determination of political representatives to take the 
long-term interests into account will be a vague and unstable foundation 
because of contradictory incentives existing in the concrete decision 
situations (Elster 1979: 42). What is required is a more 'credible 
commitment' (Shepsle 1991, Moravcsik 1998) to long-term interests. In 
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order to realise his long-term interests, an actor must sacrifice his margin 
of choice in the concrete situation, and bind himself to a suitable 'mast', 
as Ulysses did in light of the Sirens (Elster 1979: 38, 2000: 65-77). The 
'mast' available in modern societies is an appropriate institutional restraint. 
A principal will credibly bind himself if he delegates implementing 
decisions to an actor that is unsusceptible to the temptations of specific 
situations. In this way, he avoids exposing himself to the specific 
decision-situation (Cukierman 1994). 
The reversal of the traditional Principal-Agent problem draws 
attention to the fact that the principal and his agent may well employ 
different decision rationales in order to ensure that decisions are made in 
the long-term interest of the principal. The quality of regulatory decisions 
is enhanced by a sufficiently strict separation of decision-making from the 
grip of the principal (Keech 1995: 154, Majone 1999: 4-6, 2001). The 
general, i.e., long-term, interests of society in the sector will be 
determined by accommodating different, occasionally contradictory, goals 
and values. In an intergovernmental organisation, this task will require the 
support of the Member States. Application of these rules to numerous 
specific situations should be performed in a way that excludes, as far as 
possible, situation-specific and opportunistic considerations. 
To conclude, both the public choice literature and the 
Habermasian Theory of Communicative Action predict that the 
institutionalised separation of two regulatory functions, namely, the 
definition of long-term interests and general norms on the one hand, and 
situation-specific decision-making on the other, will generate normatively 
better results than the tight connection of these functions. 
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3.3.2. Discursive Norm-moulding under the 'Veil of Ignorance' 
At first glance, norm-moulding among a group of rational utility 
maximizers seems to closely resemble simple negotiations. It has been 
argued above (see Section 3.1.) that discursive interaction in negotiations 
is restricted to truth-seeking. Moreover, actors may be expected to argue, 
rather than to bargain, in negotiations only if they operate under a 
Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance'. This veil will appear if, and as long as, they 
are uncertain about their preferences. In this case, they cannot bargain 
because they do not know which of a number of available options would 
best fit their parochial interests. There is no reason to believe that this 
condition does not apply to more complex decision-making systems. 
However, uncertainty was not institutionally manipulated in simple 
negotiations. Norm-moulding in an institutional arrangement with 
differentiated functions differs in one important respect from simple 
negotiations. The participating actors address only a part of the decisions 
made in the regulatory process. The norms produced by them are applied 
to situation-specific cases elsewhere, i.e., beyond their immediate control. 
If functionally differentiated decision-making is capable of systematically 
creating communicative rationality even in discourses about the 
normative rightness of proposed regulatory solutions, it must generate 
analytical uncertainty at the norm-making level, which, in turn, forces 
actors to operate under a form of uncertainty which does not occur in 
simple negotiations. Can we expect this to happen ? 
Consider two ideal-type situations. On the one hand, there are 
narrowly delimited decision problems, such as the status of Jerusalem in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or the regulation of emissions for a 
particular type of chemical plant which is located only in one Member 
State of the Union. In these cases, the participating actors are readily able 
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to identify their preferences. When discussing the general rules ("how 
should chemical plants of type x located only in country y be 
regulated?"), rational utility maximizers will always appraise different 
options according to their effects on their preferences in the application 
stage. In these situations, an institutional arrangement of divided labour 
between norm-moulding and norm application cannot be expected to 
create any additional veil of ignorance. 
On the other hand, there are decision situations in which the 
general rule to be discussed applies to a large, possibly unknown number 
of similar cases ("How should dangerous industrial installations in the 
European Union be regulated?"). In cases of this type, selfish actors will 
also endeavour to pursue their parochial interests. However, there will no 
longer be a tailor-made norm for every specific case which might be 
influenced according to situation-specific preferences. Instead, numerous 
similar cases are linked by the particular form in which the decision 
process is organised, and may be affected only as a package. Moreover, 
their subsumption under a general norm forces actors to be consistent. 
Even if the effect of the general norm on all cases were readily calculable, 
preferences would have to focus on the 'median case'. If a general norm 
is valid for an unlimited time, actors will not even be aware of the many 
cases to which it will be applied during its lifetime, and preferences will 
become increasingly ill-determined (Brennan/Buchanan 1985: 29). In 
situations of this type, actors operate under an institutionally created 
Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance'. In both cases, rational utility maximizers 
develop an inherent interest in identifying general norms which promise 
to produce overall acceptable case-by-case decisions even if some of them 
turn out not to meet their eventual case-specific preferences, which help 
prevent disastrous outcomes (Brennan/Buchanan 1985: 28-31, Tsebelis 
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1990: 115-118). These norms cannot be identified by bargaining, i.e., by 
resorting to power resources or by building coalitions to influence the 
decision process. Hence, uncertainty created by an institutionally 
organised decision process which would not exist in case-by-case 
decision-making arrangements will motivate actors to interact in the 
mode of arguing (Vanberg/Buchanan 1989). The participating actors 
operate in an institutionally created Habermasian 'ideal speech situation', 
or in a Rawlsian 'state of nature', and enter a discourse about the 
normative rightness of proposed social norms. 
To conclude, there are cases in which an institutionally enshrined 
division of labour can be expected to contribute to the proliferation of 
communicative rationality. The social mechanism is based on the 
institutionalised exclusion of case-specific details from the negotiations. 
Accordingly, it may not be activated in all situations alike. There are two 
essential conditions that must be fulfilled: case-specific preferences must 
be sufficiently uncertain (or evenly distributed) at the time of norm-
moulding, and the cases must be sufficiently homogeneous to be 
regulated by the same general norms. Generally, incentives for bargaining 
and the relevance of parochial interests for the negotiating behaviour of 
rational utility maximizers will decrease with the number of cases to 
which a general norm applies, with the time horizon up to which the 
general norm is expected to govern application decisions, and with the 
distributive balance of the aggregate effects of well-known cases on 
actors' preferences. With decreasing incentives to bargain and to pursue 
parochial interests, the resulting decisions will tend to approach the 
standards of communicative rationality. 
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3.3.3. Reason-based Norm-application 
At application level, we cannot expect to promote communicative 
rationality by creating a veil of ignorance. Application decisions are made 
on a case-by-case basis and actors will usually be aware of their 
preferences. Hence, rational utility maximizers might resort to power in 
order to pursue their interests (Brennan/Buchanan 1985: 29). Apparendy, 
close control in the sense of mainstream Principal-Agent theory is not 
appropriate. In particular, threats to cut budgets and appoint (or dismiss) 
officials (Huber 2000) amount to implicit intervention into decision-
making and a reverse of functional differentiation. However, application 
decisions have comparatively clear-cut indicators of the common interests 
generated outside their own communication processes. Accordingly, 
appropriate administrative procedures (McCubbins et al. 1987, 
Epstein/O'Halloran 1994, Bawn 1995) must provide incentives to ensure 
the sincere application of the substantive criteria provided for by the 
general norms agreed upon elsewhere. The task is to bind the decision-
makers to these standards and motivate them to argue about their case-
specific implications. 
Rational utility maximizers may be induced to prefer reason-
based arguing to power-based bargaining by a number of different 
institutional arrangements that may be instituted without major 
difficulties even by rational utility maximizers. 
(1) Limited room for bargaining. Compared to undifferentiated 
negotiations, decision-making actors operate in a different setting. Norm-
application is always subject to criteria that limit the room for arbitrary 
decision-making, which could be filled by interest-based bargaining. And 
whereas the scope of a decision is broadened at the level of norm-
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moulding by the linkage implicit in effective schemes of divided labour 
(Section 3.3.2.), it will be narrowed at the level of norm-application to a 
single case at a time if cases are dealt with separately. The room for 
accommodating diverse interests by bargaining will virtually disappear if a 
single case is at stake. Actors cannot expect to identify a mutually 
beneficial outcome, i.e., make a decision and, at the same time, respect 
the Pareto-condition. 
Thus, in procedures based on consensus or near consensus (e.g., 
qualified-majority), an actor has basically the choice of two options. He 
may block an unwanted decision, but, if he does so, he must expect that 
others will act accordingly. The inevitable outcome of this strategy is a 
reduced decision-making capacity for the whole procedure, and the 
sacrifice of the mutually desired harmonising regulation. In game-
theoretic terms, the actors find themselves in a Prisoners' Dilemma 
situation. If the game is played in isolation, Pareto-inferior non-regulation 
may be the expected outcome. However, as soon as the actors are faced 
with a steady stream of cases, they play an iterated game. When 
calculating their preferences in individual cases, they have to take the 
effects of their choice for future cases into account. The more benefit an 
actor expects from regulation at large, the more concessions he will make 
in a particular case. We know from co-operation theory that a sufficiently 
long 'shadow of the future' may induce rational utility maximizers to co-
operate in PD situations (Axelrod 1984). 'Co-operation' in the present 
case means agreement on general standards. Hence, even rational utility 
maximizers are induced to engage in a discourse about the appropriate 
application of general norms because bargaining does not constitute a 
viable option. 
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This mechanism relies on the clear and effective separation of 
cases. Otherwise, rational utility maximizers might resort to putting 
package deals together based on the existing constellation of power and 
interests, and refrain from engaging in an application discourse. The 
separation of cases will be reinforced if single decisions enter into force 
separately, as they do in the European Union. If successfully triggered, the 
mechanism will be self-sustaining. Actors, having agreed to 
disadvantageous, but discursively reached, decisions in the past, will block 
any attempt to circumvent the agreed criteria by others. It will be in their 
interest to apply the same criteria in all cases unless they become 
convinced that there are good reasons to modify the criteria to new 
circumstances. 
(2) Staged decision-making: A second mechanism will be mobilised if 
the norm application function is assigned to a number of different bodies 
locked together in a staged decision process, rather than entrusted to an 
independent agency, as is frequently assumed in the public choice 
literature (Majone 2001). The establishment of a number of sub-systems 
which discharge specialised functions within the application procedure 
divides the decision process horizontally. This arrangement creates mutual 
interdependence and control among the sub-systems involved (see 
Kiewiet/McCubbins 1991). As in a production process based on division 
of labour, stalemate in an area of regulation can only be avoided if a sub-
system ensures that its own output is digestible by other sub-systems. If 
there is a general interest both in regulation and in avoiding stalemate, 
mutual interdependence and control generate the incentives for 
developing criteria that ensure the compatibility of the output. The 
decision-criteria provided for by the relevant directives and regulations 
constitute a focal point which is common to all the sub-systems involved, 
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independently both of their specific perspectives, and of actors involved. 
Hence, we may expect the institutional arrangement of a horizontally 
differentiated, i.e. staged, decision-process to relate decisions to the 
external decision criteria systematically. 
(3) The Giving Reasons Requirement: Application decisions are not 
only taken in the shadow of substantive decision criteria, they may also be 
made subject to justification referring to these criteria (Cohen/Sabel 
1997: 328-329). If an actor is obliged to give reasons for his decisions, he 
will endeavour to avoid decisions that are difficult to justify. Moreover, 
the requirement to give reasons provides other actors with better 
opportunities to challenge an undesired decision because it can be 
appraised on the basis of the reasons given (Shapiro 1992). Accordingly, 
strict accountability (Majone 1994) of decision-making sub-systems 
increases the power of relevant general norms, and vice versa: general 
norms to which the reasons can refer promise better accountability of 
decision-making sub-systems. 
(4) Judicial Review. Finally, in institutions comprising a judicial 
review mechanism, such as the European Union, courts play an 
important role in producing reasonable administrative decisions. Judicial 
review constitutes an additional and final stage in the decision process. 
Moreover, a court constitutes a sub-system of the institution which 
typically specialises in the application of the appropriate general norms to 
a particular case (Shapiro 1981). It does so based upon internal procedures 
that are typically designed to create a legal discourse (Habermas 1992). 
Hence, the threat of judicial review closely relates decision-making to 
binding general norms, or, at least, provides an incentive for doing so. In 
so far as this last step of the decision chain is anticipated, a decision will 
be made compatible with the existing legal restrictions. It also becomes an 
I l l Thomas Gehring 
anticipated legal decision, and the interaction from which it emerges is 
partially transformed into a legal discourse. The margin open for arbitrary 
decision-making, i.e., for the intervention of other, say, power-based 
criteria, diminishes or is reduced to the choice between options which 
are equally justifiable before the Court. 
Altogether, we may, theoretically, identify the institutional 
arrangements which generate strong incentives for the actors involved to 
reach outcomes which stand up to an examination of a practical 
application discourse. These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive; their 
effects reinforce each other. Once again, they are based on the separation 
of the functions of norm-moulding and norm application. Moreover, we 
could not/cannot? expect rational utility maximizers to agree upon a 
norm application discourse in an isolated case, because both the winners 
and losers would be readily identifiable. Only by implicitly linking many 
cases can actors gain a common interest in co-operation. And we could 
not/cannot? expect actors to engage in an application discourse unless 
they have a substantive standard at their disposal, according to which a 
case may be decided upon conformity with the general interest. 
4. Communicative Rationality in Single 
Market Regulation 
Decision-making in the European single market policy is characterised by 
a high degree of delegation and functional differentiation 
(Wallace/Young 2000). The policy forms the core of the integration 
process from its very beginning, and is among the most advanced policies 
in its kind. It is probably not wrong to state that the European single 
market is, among the most important factors, what attracts new members 
to the Union. 
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In this section, I will more closely explore the consequences of 
differentiated decision-making in the single market against the backdrop 
of the theoretical propositions about the prospects of institutionally driven 
communicative action made in Section 3. I argue that, while not 
unimportant, neither the separation of the treaty level and the legislative 
level, nor the horizontal differentiation of decision functions at the 
legislative level will create a profound transformation of decision-making 
towards communicative rationality compared to simple negotiation 
systems (1). In contrast, I find the institutional pre-requisites for reason-
based interaction in the arrangements of the so-called 'New Approach' 
(2). 
4.1. No Profound Changes Caused by Delegation of Decisions 
from Treaty-level to Legislative Level 
After more than fifty years of European integration, the Member States 
still play an important role (Sbragia 1992) in the decision process. Similar 
to any regular international organisation or regime, the Member States 
control the access of new members, and only states may accede to the 
Union. Moreover, the Member States dominate the top level of 
European decision-making where the European treaties are made and 
amended under procedures that are very close to international treaty-
making. For analytical purposes, we may consider the Union as an 
international organisation with a high degree of delegation 
(Keohane/Hoffmann 1991). 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) which, like single 
market policy, is directed at market integration and at removing trade 
restrictions gackson 1999) may be considered as the 'bottom line' of 
traditional international co-operation. In the GATT/WTO, trade policy 
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is made in encompassing trade rounds. Accordingly, the agreements of 
the most recent trade round, concluded in Marrakech, filled several 
thousand pages of treaty language and legally-binding annexes 
(Hoekman/Kostecki 1995). If the single market programme had been 
realised according to the procedures established in GATT/WTO, its 
approximatelty 300 measures would have been prepared in the course of 
an overall European trade round and adopted in a single decision on the 
whole package. Instead, the Single European Act adopted by an 
intergovernmental conference in 1986 requires only a few pages in the 
Official Journal of the EU (Lodge 1986, 1994). The bulk of the decisions 
necessary to create the single market were delegated to other levels of 
European poUcy-making. 
Does the division of labour between the treaty level and the 
legislative level promote communicative rationality? To answer this 
question, we must examine the functions performed by the two decision-
making levels more closely. 
Two European 'grand bargains' are of particular relevance for 
European single market policy. In the 'Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community' of 1956, the Member States agreed on the 
establishment of a common market which, inter alia, included the so-
called 'four freedoms' for goods, services, labour, and capital (Moravcsik 
1998: 86-158, Milward 1992: 196-223). These freedoms are phrased in 
very broad terms. They apply to numerous similar cases over a long time 
span. Negotiators were apparendy not in a position to calculate the 
domestic implications of these rules and, therefore, operated almost 
automatically under a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. To the degree to which 
these rules are directly applicable, they have provided a strong basis for 
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court decision-making. Extensive litigation (VerLoren van Themaat 
1988) has led to the development of powerful doctrines, such as the 
famous 'Cassis-de-Dijon' doctrine (Garrett 1992, Alter/Meunier-
Aitsahalia 1994). If we can consider court decision-making with its 
exchange of legal arguments and its triadic structure which will almost 
entirely preclude bargaining, the creation of the four freedoms and their 
implementation by the European Court of Justice may be considered as 
an institutional arrangement driving decisions towards communicative 
rationality. However, it is less interesting for the present paper because it 
does not envisage any role for collective (political) action. 
In many trade-relevant areas, the four freedoms are not directly 
applicable because domestic regulation serves to protect the health and 
life of consumers and workers, the environment, and other legitimate 
purposes, and thus, cannot simply be declared void. In these areas, market 
integration relies on harmonised European standards. The original EEC-
Treaty of 1956 enabled the Community to adopt harmonising legislation 
(Article 94, ex-100) under the consultation procedure which required 
unanimity in the Council. As this proved to be overly cumbersome and 
time-consuming, the Member States paved the way for a reform of 
harmonisation policy (Ehlermann 1987, Moravcsik 1991, Cameron 
1992). With the Single European Act of 1986 (Lodge 1986, 1994), they 
introduced a new decision-making procedure (first called co-operation, 
later replaced by the co-decision procedure), which provided for 
qualified-majority in the Council, and, for the first time, granted some 
real legislative powers to the European Parliament, while upholding the 
established exclusive right of initiative of the Commission. Negotiations 
on the areas to which these procedures were applicable, allowed countries 
to bargain. It is well-known that countries block majority-voting in areas 
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in which they preferred the non-harmonised status quo to harmonised 
regulation. For example, Britain preferred to maintain its border controls 
(Moravscik 1991), and Luxembourg its freedom on interest-tax matters. 
However, to the extent that all participants prefer market liberalisation to 
the status quo, we have an almost perfect arguing situation. Negotiations 
of the particularities of the procedures fulfil the conditions of deliberation 
under the veil of ignorance. Decision procedures are applicable over 
many years to numerous case-specific decisions, and the Member States 
can expect to be among the winners of harmonisation in some instances 
and among the losers in others, without being readily able to calculate the 
aggregate effects of the procedures on their aggregate preferences. 
Undoubtedly, these procedural decisions had an impact on the making of 
delegated decisions. 
In contrast to providing procedures, the Member States abstained 
from determining substantive guidelines for harmonisation - apart from 
the provision that harmonising legislation should be at a high level of 
protection. It is true that they endorsed the Single Market Programme 
prepared by the Commission (COM 85/310), but the programme did 
not provide any serious information about the substance of future 
harmonised legislation. Hence, an abstract 'community interest' to be 
applied in case-by-case decisions through legislation was not defined at 
treaty level. Instead, the Member States passed the entire margin of 
choice that was available at treaty level on to the legislative level. 
Accordingly, there is no effective division of labour between the making 
of general rules and their application to cases, which had been identified 
as a pre-requisite for the promotion of communicative rationality 
(Section 3.1.). 
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Do the new European legislative procedures, especially the 
widely applied co-decision procedure, promote communicative 
rationality? Compared to the bottom-line of pure inter-governmental 
negotiations, they introduce a number of modifications. The Commission 
enjoys the exclusive right of initiative; the European Parliament is granted 
the opportunity to intervene into the legislative process, and the Council 
decides by qualified-majority voting. In the past years, there has been an 
extensive debate especially on the exact role of the European Parliament 
in the different legislative processes (Garrett/Tsebehs 1995, 
Hubschmidt/Moser 1997). This new stage institutionahses some kind of 
checks by the ParHament, but it is difficult to see how it could 
systematically drive outcomes towards communicative rationality. Given 
that the members of the ParHament represent societal interests, there is no 
need to expect parHamentary proceedings to be per se more dehberative 
than intergovernmental ones. What is more important is the 
concentration of the functions of the 'poHcy-entrepreneur' (Young 
1991), and of the cognitive and technical preparation of proposals at the 
Commission. During the Commission stage, there may weU be 
deHberation on the opportunities of co-operation (location of the Pareto-
frontier) as weU as on the empirical facts relevant to a regulatory project. 
DeHberation may weU include non-state actors such as interest groups. 
While opportunities will be better exploited by the separation of the 
preparatory stage from the decision stage, truth-seeking deliberation of 
this sort may be also be expected in undifferentiated negotiations (Section 
3.1.). The Commission might even deliberate internaUy or with external 
actors about the normative tightness of a norm. However, the Council 
remains the botdeneck through which all legislative projects have to pass, 
and in which many of them are watered down in protracted and time-
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consuming inter-governmental negotiations. Whether the Council 
decides by unanimity, as the Member States prefer, or by qualified-
majority voting, does not change their ability to bargain over the 
particularities of a proposal. The Member States tend to block proposals 
which do not fulfil the Pareto-conditions, particularly for a qualified-
majority. Accordingly, legislative decisions are still heavily influenced by 
the parochial interests of the Member States and their power resources. 
Clearly, the 'Community method' (Lindberg/Scheingold 1970) 
of European governance is not without consequences. For example, 
European policy-making is characterised by the adoption of numerous 
decisions of comparatively limited relevance (Gehring 2000). The 
Commission prefers small projects because they limit the room for 
manoeuvre of, and deal with, the Member States. In the same vein, 
rational utility maximizers will also not bargain as hard on subjects with 
limited consequences as on those with important ones (Fearon 1998a) 
because the transaction costs outweigh the possible gains. However, 
consequences of this sort do not hinder the Member States from 
bargaining, and thus do not systematically affect their decision-making 
rationale. In short, we cannot expect the legislative procedures to drive 
outcomes systematically towards communicative rationality. 
4.2. The Pre-requisites for Communicative Rationality in the 
'New Approach' 
The bottleneck of Council decision-making is particularly narrow in cases 
in which European harmonisation legislation is based on a choice 
between discrete co-operative solutions. The ideal case of only two 
options amounts to a game theoretic 'battle of the sexes' which is 
notoriously difficult to overcome in negotiations. Moreover, the Council 
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is over-burdened with the all too detailed and technical legislation which 
will frequently have to be adapted to new circumstances every now and 
then. The adoption of some directives, for example, on 'the 
Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Seamless, 
UnaUoyed Aluminium and Aluminium AUoy Gas Cylinders' (ABl. 1984 
L 300: 20-47), took about ten years (Falke 1989). Other projects were 
overly detailed. For example, the Commission proposal for a 'Directive 
on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to 
RoU-over Protection Structures Incorporating two Pillars and Mounted 
in Front of the Driver's Seat on Narrow-Track Wheeled Agricultural or 
Forestry Tractors' filled almost 80 pages in the Official Journal of the EU 
(OJ 1985 C 222: 1-77). Moreover, the Member States have enacted 
more new product standards than could possibly be harmonised by the 
Union. Thus, the race with technical progress could not be won by 
traditional harmonising legislation alone (Lauwars 1988: 154-56, Falke 
1989: 220). 
Single market policy does not, therefore, rely entirely on the 
realisation of the legislative measures of the programme (Schmidt v. Sydow 
1988: 94-98). It envisages the creation of a third level of decision-making 
- thus reinforcing the differentiation of decision-making. According to 
this 'New Approach', legislation was limited to providing for the 
minimum requirements for the protection of health and safety as weU as 
the procedures for the adoption of delegated decisions (Pelkmans 1987, 
Joerges et «/. 1988: 341-365). AU detailed regulation of particular product, 
was referred to a lower level of decision-making (COM 85/310: 19), 
especiaUy to European standardisation organisations. The 'New 
Approach' had the immediate consequence of relieving the Council of 
the task of defining detaüed requirements for narrowly limited groups of 
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products. From then on, directives and regulations governing subjects as 
large as 'machines', toys', 'food additives', or 'pharmaceuticals', were 
adopted in a comparatively short negotiation time. 
This form of regulation seems to be quite successful. The 
Commission has repeatedly, most recendy in its White Paper on 
European Governance (COM 2001/428), proposed to expand its scope 
to new areas of regulation. It is thus a comparatively modern form of 
regulation in Europe that may be expected to gain relevance in the 
future. Moreover, it provides the basis for the observed transformation of 
policy-making 'from strategic interaction into deliberative problem-
solving' (Joerges/Neyer 1997b). 
'New Approach' instruments largely fulfil the conditions of 
norm-moulding under a veil of ignorance. If a single legislative 
instrument devises substantive and procedural criteria for the 
authorisation of drugs for human, or for the safety requirements of 
'machines' or 'toys', or for the authorisation of 'food additives', it will be 
applied to numerous cases over time. Accordingly, the Member States 
negotiating in the Council, as well as the supranational actors intervening 
into the process, cannot reliably calculate their aggregate preferences over 
all cases. To some degree at least, they will have to operate under a veil of 
ignorance. In an empirical research project, we found little evidence that 
Member States actually bargained over the safety standards. Instead, 
bargaining was largely limited to other areas, for example, the scope of 
the respective instruments (Krapohl 2002, Stefanova/Kerler 2002). This 
effect is neither incidental, nor inherent to the regulated subject matter. It 
is an immediate consequence of the institutional arrangement which 
effectively separates the moulding of general, i.e., not case-specific, 
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criteria from their subsequent application in single cases. The effect 
would not have occurred if each product, or small group of products, had 
been regulated by a separate specific directive, as was the case prior to the 
'New Approach'. In this case, the Member States would have had a 
rather clear idea of their case-specific preferences and would, accordingly, 
have bargained over the distribution of costs and benefits. 
The 'New Approach' legislation refers the bulk of detailed 
product specification to a subsidiary level of decision-making, which 
operates according to different procedures. Generally, we may distinguish 
between three types of decision-making: 
• Embedded in a multi-step procedure involving the Commission 
and the Member States, harmonisation projects are assigned to 
privately organised European standardisation organisations, for 
example, the 'Comite Europeen de Normalisation'. (CEN) (Vos 
1999: 251-311, Anselmann 1991, Voelzkow 1996, Falke 1997, 
Stefanova/ Kerler 2002). Standards enter into force upon 
authorisation by the Commission after consultation with the 
Member States. While not legally-binding, they oblige the 
Member States to presume that products that are in conformity 
with a standard also meet the requirements of the mandatory 
directive. (Pelkmans 1987: 255). However, the Member States 
still remain responsible for product safety in their jurisdictions, 
and may, in exceptional cases, prohibit the access of dangerous 
products onto their markets, even if they are in conformity with 
a standard. (Joerges/Falke 1991, Joerges et al. 1988, Schreiber 
1991). According to the 'safeguards procedure', the step must be 
justified and a final decision is taken by the Commission. (Vos 
1999: 308). The procedure is comparatively successful. Today, at 
least 15 directives provide a basis for standardisation, while 
several hundreds of standards have been authorised. (Vos 1999: 
275). 
• In some particularly sensitive areas, such as foodstuffs, the 'New 
Approach' refers secondary decision-making to the so-called 
'Comitology-'committees, in which the Member States, chaired 
by a Commission representative, decide about Commission 
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directives and regulations according to different procedures. (Vos 
1997). Several directives on the regulation of foodstuffs delegate 
decision-making to the 'Standing Committee on Foodstuffs' 
(Bücker et al. 1996, Henkin 1996: 5-8, Vos 1999: 110-187) and 
provide for substantive and procedural criteria for secondary 
decisions. Several Directives in the food sector, for example, 
prescribe that the regulatory committee must hear the scientific 
advice by the Scientific Committee for Food (Vos 1999: 140) so 
that scientific advice is taken into account. (Joerges/Neyer 1997a: 
286). 
• Finally, regulation in the single market involves agencies with 
limited competences that are independent from the Commission. 
(Everson 1996). The most relevant of the currently existing 
agencies (see Kreher 1997: 229-231) is the European Medical 
Evaluation Agency (EMEA), founded in 1993 and located in 
London. (Krapohl 2002). It occupies a core role in the multi-step 
procedure for the licensing of pharmaceutical products in the 
single market (Gardener 1996, Sauer 1996, Vos 1999: 188-250). 
While legally-binding decisions are ultimately adopted in a 
committee procedure by the Commission and the Member 
States, deviation from EMEA evaluations is stricdy limited. This 
new type of regulation adapts the model of regulatory agencies, 
which are particularly widespread in the USA (Shapiro 1988, 
1997, Majone 1990), to the European polity. The EMEA 
constitutes a prototype for future agencies, for example, the 
European Food Agency, proposed by the Commission (COM 
2000/716). 
In spite of their comparatively different procedures, the three types of 
single market regulation have a number of common characteristics. First 
of all, they are all decisions which are subject to substantive requirements. 
These standards are most detailed in the directives which refer 
implementation decisions to standardisation organisations as well as, by 
reference to other instruments, in the regulation on pharmaceutical 
products. Substantive standards are not codified so well in the foodstuffs 
sector. However, for issues on which the Commission and the 
(administrative) members of a comitology committee do not have the 
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necessary expertise, the ECJ requires consultation even if the relevant 
directive does not clearly stipulate consultation obligations (ECJ C 
212/91, 1994 1-200-214, at 210, Angelopharm). 
Second, substantive standards are used to appraise decisions. All 
three types of 'New Approach' regulation directly employ the 
requirement to give reasons in one way or another. In the procedure for 
the authorisation of pharmaceutical products for humans, the EMEA is 
obliged to give reasons for its scientific assessment, and the Commission 
must justify a possible decision to deviate from the EMEA opinion. In 
European standardisation, Member States employing the safeguards 
procedure to deviate from an authorised standard must expressly justify 
their decisions. While the decision-makers, namely, the Commission and 
the comitology committee, are not formally bound to follow the 
scientific advice in the foodstuffs sector, they must provide sufficient 
reasons for their decisions to enable the Court to review whether the 
scope of legitimate assessment has been overstepped (ECJ C-69/90, 1994 
1-5495-5503, at 5499, Technische Universtät, München). This will be 
considerably more difficult if the decision deviates from a scientific 
advice, than if it is in conformity with this advice. Moreover, all decisions 
discussed in this paper formally fall to the responsibility of the 
Commission and may be challenged before the European Court of 
Justice. As formally binding-decisions, they are automatically integrated 
into the European legal system and are subject to judicial review by the 
ECJ. Hence, decisions must also be justifiable in legal proceedings. 
Third, all three types of new approach regulation limit the room 
for deliberate decision-making through a close delimitation of cases. 
Decisions are made on single norms, or on the authorisation of a single 
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pharmaceutical product, or a single food additive. If adopted, decisions 
enter into force. Accordingly, they are treated separately from each other, 
and Member States cannot usually link decisions to larger package deals. 
Fourth, all procedures include staged decision-making in which 
sub-systems control each other. European standardisation is based on a 
multi-tier procedure which involves the Commission and the Member 
States at the beginning, the private standardisation organisations in the 
middle stage, the Commission and the Member States again in the 
approval stage, and eventually individual Member States and the 
Commission in the so-called 'safeguards-procedure'. (Stefanova/Kerler 
2002). The authorisation of pharmaceutical products relies on a three-
staged procedure, locking together the EMEA, which is responsible for 
the scientific evaluation, with the Commission and a comitology 
committee in which the Member States dominate, (see Krapohl 2002). 
Finally, the regulatory committee procedure in the foodstuffs sector 
relates the Commission, which chairs the comitology-committees, to the 
Member States. Whereas the Member States may, within the limits left 
for bargaining, tend to agree on a deal which accommodates interests, the 
Commission has an interest not to overstep the margin of the free choice 
provided for by the relevant legislative instrument. This is also because 
the Commission is responsible for decisions of this type, and court 
proceedings will be directed against it (see Joerges/ Neyer 1997a: 286). 
Although the arrangements differ considerably, all of them are designed 
to mobilise this control mechanism, and none of them invests authority in 
a single actor. 
In short, lower level decision-making in areas governed by the 
'New Approach' does not exclude stakeholders, be they Member States 
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or non-state actors. And application decisions are not assigned to a 
powerful independent agency. Instead, the institutional arrangements are 
designed to increase the relevance of substantive standards and reason-
based interaction between the actors involved. 
5. Conclusion: Consequences for 
Democratising the European Union 
The system of policy-making in the single market may be 'opaque' and 
difficult to understand. However, the complicated institutional 
arrangements of the 'New Approach' bear the potential of systematically 
generating outcomes that meet the public interest. These institutional 
arrangements may not only improve the efficiency of supranational 
governance, they may also enhance its legitimacy in the Habermasian 
sense. 
In this paper, I have explored the question of whether the 
impressive decision-making apparatus of the European Union has a 
significandy higher potential to produce 'good' decisions than simple 
negotiating systems. For this purpose, I have drawn from two branches of 
the literature that are usually ignorant of each other, namely, 
Habermasian theory of communicative action and rational choice analysis. 
From Habermas, we can learn that inter-subjective relationships are not 
just shaped by power and the parochial interests of the actors involved. 
They may also be influenced by validity claims and their accompanying 
reasons. Accordingly, reasons become a resource in addition to, and 
distinct from, the power which actors may employ to pursue their goals. 
From Habermasian communicative action, we may derive a discursive 
form of interaction, namely, arguing, which allows actors to appraise the 
rationality of validity claims. And we obtain a standard for the appraisal of 
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the quality of real world norms and decisions. Rational in the 
Habermasian sense means those norms and decisions that withstand a 
practical discourse about their validity. 
Unfortunately, the world is not as ideal as we may desire. Thus, 
from rational choice analysis, we may learn to examine the incentives 
which motivate the behaviour of actors even if they are not inclined to 
put community interests first. Real world actors will not always behave as 
egoistically as rational utility maximizers. However, the institutional 
arrangements that affect these stylised actors positively will be more 
robust than those which may succeed only if actors disregard their 
parochial interests. On this basis, we have seen that isolated negotiations 
offer a certain potential for discursive interaction and communicative 
rationality, but they cannot be expected to motivate selfish actors to side-
step their interests and refrain from resorting to their power resources. In 
contrast, more complex decision-making systems, such as that of the 
European Union, may do so. Institutional arrangements may change the 
situations in which actors operate, affect their preferences, and, 
subsequently, influence their behaviour in ways that produce collective 
outcomes which approach communicative rationality. The key for 
understanding this effect is the functional differentiation of a decision 
process, i.e., the distribution of a given decision-load to the sub-systems 
that fulfil the complementary functions. The systematic separation of the 
functions of norm-moulding and norm-application is of particular 
relevance for the generation of communicative rationality. Under certain 
conditions, which have been explored in detail in Section 3, this step may 
force actors at the norm-moulding level to operate under a Rawlsian 'veil 
of ignorance', and induce them to enter a discourse on the appropriate 
application of the relevant norms at the norm-application level. This type 
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of functionally differentiated decision-making has been found in the 
institutional organisation of 'New Approach' decision-making. 
However, the arrangement does not come without a price. 
Politically legitimated supervision, for example, by the governments of 
Member States or by a parliamentary majority are largely replaced by the 
institutionalised self-control of the system. To put it more drastically: the 
institutional generation of Habermasian rationality depends on the 
readiness of politically legitimated actors not to intervene deliberately into 
differentiated decision processes and not to attempt to control their 
outcomes. However, this system of deliberate non-intervention is also 
institutionalised in the rule of law as well as the separation of 
administration from policy-making of modern democracies. 
The insights of this paper have three consequences for the 
discussions on European governance and the democratic deficit: 
1. If the systematic separation of norm-making from norm-
application provides the foundation for generating outcomes that 
are rational in the Habermasian sense, it is not useful to struggle 
for a politicisation - or to put it differently, for increased political 
control - of all European decisions. Instead, delegation 
arrangements that systematically restrict political control to the 
making of general norms, while avoiding political intervention 
during their application, bring the promise of increased 
legitimacy of the European Union. 
2. This does not necessarily mean that the Commission has to be 
empowered, or that the Member States have to be deprived of an 
important role at the application level. The 'New Approach' 
arrangements demonstrate that the Commission is relevant, but 
also that it does not control the procedures itself. It is locked into 
the multi-staged procedures like any other sub-system. The 'New 
Approach' also demonstrates that Member States, in particular, if 
they are acting through their specialised administrations, may well 
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perform important functions in a staged norm application 
process, albeit without being able to politically control the 
process and its outcomes. 
3. We may even conclude that the relevance of formal decision-
making power diminishes the degree to which the separation of 
functions creates a veil of ignorance at the norm-moulding level 
and induces the participating actors to enter a discursive search 
for the most appropriate ('best') solution. Thus, it is more 
important that, during its preparation, a legislative proposal is 
discussed with many different actors, including interest groups 
and Member State administrations. 
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